Digital Commons @ Touro Law
Center
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

2011

Busting Blocks: Revisiting 47 U.S.C. §230 to Address the Lack of
Effective Legal Recourse for Wrongful Inclusion in Spam Filters
Jonathan I. Ezor
Touro Law Center, jezor@tourolaw.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/scholarlyworks
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Communications Law Commons, and the Science and
Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jonathan I. Ezor, Busting Blocks: Revisiting 47 U.S.C. § 230 to Address the Lack of Effective Legal
Recourse for Wrongful Inclusion in Spam Filters, XVII Rich. J.L. & Tech. 7 (2011), http://jolt.richmond.edu/
v17i2/article7.pdf.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Touro Law
Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @
Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 2

BUSTING BLOCKS: REVISITING 47 U.S.C. § 230 TO ADDRESS THE
LACK OF EFFECTIVE LEGAL RECOURSE FOR WRONGFUL
INCLUSION IN SPAM FILTERS
By Jonathan I. Ezor∗
Cite as: Jonathan I. Ezor, Busting Blocks: Revisiting 47
U.S.C. § 230 to Address the Lack of Effective Legal
Recourse for Wrongful Inclusion in Spam Filters, XVII
Rich.
J.L.
&
Tech.
7
(2011),
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v17i2/article7.pdf.
I. INTRODUCTION: E-MAIL, BLOCK LISTS, AND THE LAW
[1]
Consider a company that uses e-mail to conduct a majority of its
business, including customer and vendor communication, marketing, and
filing official documents. After conducting business in this manner for
several years, one day the company discovers that its most recent e-mails
were not delivered to recipients using a major Internet Service Provider
(“ISP”) because the company was recently listed on an automated block
list as a sender of unwanted bulk commercial e-mail (“spam”).1 The
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Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Central Islip, NY. The author wishes to
acknowledge the invaluable help of Jerry Simon and Andrew Van Singel in the
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Earlier drafts of this article were posted at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=944551, presented at the International
Association of IT Lawyers’ December 2006 International Conference at Business, Law
and Technology, available at http://www.iblt.eu/IBLT2006/ (last visited July 23, 2010),
and published in the proceedings for that conference.
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1

See Jargon Buster, OFF. FOR INTERNET SAFETY, http://www.internetsafety.ie/website/
ois/oisweb.nsf/page/48AF34B2EDEF4B77802574C70054D7D1 (last visited Jan. 18,
2011).
1
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company’s status on the block list affects not only marketing e-mails, but
all e-mails sent from the business’s server.2 Worse still, an overseas
organization, rather than the company’s ISP, controls the block list, and its
policy is to disregard complaints of improper blocking from anyone other
than an e-mail sender’s ISP.3
[2]
Now imagine a marketer that utilizes third-party affiliates to reach
a broader customer base.4 The marketer provides its affiliates with
guidelines regarding proper marketing techniques, including refraining
from sending spam, but, despite the marketer’s efforts, one affiliate
distributes unsolicited e-mail messages. It is reasonable to suggest that the
affiliate employing the unauthorized marketing technique will end up on a
block list, but what about the marketer?
[3]
Next, consider an ISP’s customers. While the majority of those
customers practice responsible modes of e-marketing, one chooses to send
out millions of spam messages. Rather than identifying and sanctioning
the rouge spammer, the block list operator places all of the ISP’s
customers on the block list.5

2

See What are Blacklists?, MAILCHIMP, http://www.mailchimp.com/kb/article/what-areblacklists/ (last updated Dec. 2, 2009).
3

Given the nature of the service, block list operators likely will not address complaints
from a blocked sender without some reassurance (i.e. confirmation from an ISP) that the
sender is not a spammer. See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), ROKSO FAQ,
SPAMHAUS, http://www.spamhaus.org/faq/answers.lasso?section=ROKSO%20FAQ#24
(last visited Jan. 16, 2011) [hereinafter ROKSO FAQ] (“Spamhaus regularly receives
letters from spammer’s [sic] lawyers attempting to claim that all of a spammers [sic]
records are in error and demanding all therefore be removed. [Spamhaus] naturally
pay[s] little attention to such requests.”).
4

See Affiliate Marketing, ENTREPRENEUR, http://www.entrepreneur.com/encyclopedia/
term/82092.html, (last visited Jan. 27, 2011) (defining Affiliate Marketing as “[a] way for
a company to sell its products by signing up individuals or companies (‘affiliates’) who
market the company's products for a commission. There are two ways to approach
affiliate marketing: You can offer an affiliate program to others or you can sign up to be
another business's affiliate.”).
5

See Carl Brooks, Cloud Computing News: Amazon EC2 Email Blocked by Antispam
Group
Spamhaus,
SEARCHCLOUDCOMPUTING.COM
(Oct.
14,
2009),
2
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[4]
Finally, picture an ISP that assigns a new customer an Internet
Protocol (“IP”) address formerly issued to a spammer.6 When the new
customer tries to send an e-mail, she discovers that she is unable to do so
because the previous user’s spamming activities condemned the IP address
to a block listing.7
[5]
In the preceding hypotheticals, those improperly placed on a block
list may well pursue the following course of action to remedy the
situation. First, the parties may seek to work with their ISPs to resolve the
problem.8 If the ISP is unable or unwilling to assist in the matter, the
parties will likely request the block list operator to remove them from the
block list.9 If this endeavor proves unsuccessful, possibly because the
block list operator is unwilling to communicate with “spammers,” is

http://searchcloudcomputing.techtarget.com/news/1371369/Amazon-EC2-email-blockedby-antispam-group-Spamhaus.
6

Every device connected to the Internet is given a unique numerical address, the Internet
Protocol (“IP”) address, to allow identification by, and communication with, other
connected devices. See GERHARD RUFA, DEVELOPMENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, 60
(2008). ISPs, for example, are granted blocks of IP addresses by one of five Regional
Internet Registries (“RIR”), including the American Registry for Internet Numbers
(“ARIN”), which receives the authority to allocate IP addresses from the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (“IANA”), a single recognized global body. See Number
Resource Policy Manual, AM. REGISTRY FOR INTERNET NUMBERS, 3 (Sept. 9, 2010),
https://www.arin.net/policy/nrpm.pdf. An ISP, having been issued a finite list of IP
addresses to provide to its customers, may choose either static (one IP address per
subscriber) or dynamic (IP addresses no longer in use are re-allocable for future use) IP
address allocation. Cf. Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines, RFC 2050, INTERNET
ASSIGNED NUMBERS AUTHORITY, 6 (Nov. 1996), http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/
rfc2050.txt.pdf.
7

See infra notes 152-65 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty associated with
obtaining removal from a block list).
8

See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997).

9

See Pallorium, Inc. v. Jared, No. G036124, 2007 WL 80955, *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan., 11
2007).
3
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unreachable via any reasonable means, or simply chooses not to remove
the victim from the list, the parties likely will turn to the courts.10
[6]
Claims resulting from improper spam blocking typically fall under
the category of traditional business tort litigation, particularly if the
affected organization is unable to operate its business, loses opportunities,
or misses mandatory legal deadlines because of its restricted access to its
e-mail services.11 However, following the passage and interpretation of 47
U.S.C. § 230, et seq., which is codified under the Communications
Decency Act (“CDA”)12 and seeks to encourage Internet growth while
focusing protection on user-created and distributed material,13 business
tort litigation does not provide an easy cure to improper block listings.14

10

See id.

11

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766-74 (1979) (outlining the long history of
business tort litigation in which companies that suffer loss are eligible to receive
monetary or equitable remedies to undo or at least mitigate the damage); infra Part VIII
(discussing potential commercial claims for wrongful block listing).
12

The Communications Decency Act of 1934 (“CDA”) was enacted as part of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, see Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56, in response to cases such as Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Services Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995),
which drew significant criticism for arguably holding all online content providers liable
under defamation law for everything third parties place on their sites or services,
requiring providers to fact-check each posting or remove the ability of third parties to add
content. See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citing a statement in the House Conference Report that overruling Stratton Oakmont was
“one of the specific purposes” of 47 U.S.C. § 230) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Susan Benkelman, Watch Your Talk, Online Cops Walk Thin Line in
Monitoring, NEWSDAY, Dec. 26, 1995, at A8 (discussing the challenges before online
services with respect to monitoring in light of the seemingly conflicting concepts of
Congress and the Prodigy case). CDA’s main provisions amended 47 U.S.C. § 223 to
prohibit the transmission of “obscene or indecent” material to recipients under 18, and
were challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union and ultimately held
unconstitutional. See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). But, § 509, the
portion of the CDA at issue in this article, was not challenged in Reno and remains valid
and enforceable. See 47 U.S.C. § 203 (2006). See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844 (1997).
13

See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006).
4
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Title 47, section 230(c) of the United States Code provides that:
(1) . . . No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content
provider.
(2) . . . No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be held liable on account of-(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected;
or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical means
to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).15

Subsection (e)(3) goes on to state in relevant part that, “[n]o cause of
action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or
local law that is inconsistent with this section.”16
[8]
While the initial context of 47 U.S.C. § 230 targeted defamation
via message boards, some courts have interpreted the statute broadly to
cover a range of situations where one party places content on another

14

See Pallorium, 2007 WL 80955, at *5.

15

47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). Note that the reference to “paragraph (1)” appears
erroneous and meant instead to refer to subsection (c)(2)(A). Id. §230(c)(2) n.1; Zango,
568 F.3d at 1173 n.5 (“We take it that the reference to the ‘material described in
paragraph (1)’ is a typographical error, and that instead the reference should be to
paragraph (A), i.e., § 230(c)(2)(A).”) (emphasis omitted).
16

47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (2006).
5
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party’s server or web site.17 The statute essentially immunizes an ISP
taking steps to protect its users from objectionable content, and finds its
rationale in the belief that granting such immunity will encourage
productive, safe Internet resources.18 Common among statutes designed to
address the Internet and other advanced technologies, the drafters’ intent
and statutory language may not have adequately anticipated future
technological and business developments.19 Thus, the language and
jurisprudence of 47 U.S.C. § 230, its second section in particular, produce
the result that block list providers are largely untouchable in court.20
[9]
The precedent surrounding 47 U.S.C. § 230 makes it unlikely that
courts will significantly diverge from the current understanding and

17

See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (applying 47
U.S.C. § 230 where the plaintiff filed against an online service provider after a third party
posted false, offensive advertisements that included the plaintiff’s contact information).
The court noted that “[b]y its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any
cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with
a third-party user of the service.” Id.
18

See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31; David S. Ardia, Free Speech
Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 410-11
(2010).
19

See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2006). In In re MasterCard Int'l Inc., the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s judgment that defendant credit card companies’ involvement
with internet gambling websites did not violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”) or the Wire Act. 313 F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 2002). The
court reasoned that because the Wire Act did not outlaw internet gambling websites, the
RICO Act did not apply and summary judgment was granted to the credit card
companies. Id.
20

See, e.g., Pallorium, Inc. v. Jared, No. G036124, 2007 WL 80955, *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 11, 2007) (finding a block list provider immune under 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)). The
policy discussion of Ardia’s study (like most of the cases addresses in his article) focuses
on subsection (c)(1) of 47 U.S.C. § 230, a service provider’s immunity against liability
for another party’s content. See Ardia, supra note 18, at 412 n.194. As this Article
demonstrates, it is subsection (c)(2) that more directly addresses the activities of major
block list providers, as the brevity and lack of substantive due process requirements lead
to a lack of recourse for those improperly placed on block lists. See 47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(2).
6
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breadth of immunity the statute grants block list providers.21 An
appropriate remedy to this issue requires statutory revision that will
establish a more reasonable and objective standard to delineate the
conduct of block list operators and communicative third-party vendors,
and set forth procedural avenues through which an aggrieved party may
seek to rectify an incorrect block listing or obtain assistance from the
courts. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) provides a
model for such revision, as it grants site owners an analogous safe harbor
for copyright liability from third-party content,22 and, unlike 47 U.S.C. §
230, mandates that site owners comply with all necessary prerequisites
and implement adequate procedures to obtain protection.23 Admittedly
inexact for comparison, some DMCA procedures may be burdensome
given the volume of parties the major block lists impact.24 However, such
practices remain preferable to the subjective policies and arbitrary
decisions currently in place among block list operators, who manage
access to millions of personal and professional inboxes throughout the
world.25
[10] Spam is a true Internet plague. It slows down systems, clogs
storage devices, and makes it difficult for users to find desired messages in
a sea of solicitations for questionable medical products, ways to “make
money fast,” offers for companionship, and other unsolicited pitches.26
Efforts to grant service providers and users some level of control over the
volume and type of messages they receive, by both technologists and

21

See infra Part VIII.

22

17 U.S.C. § 512(b)-(c) (2006).

23

Id. § 512(i).

24

See, e.g., About Spamhaus, SPAMHAUS, http://www.spamhaus.org/organization/
index.lasso (last visited Jan. 27, 2011) (“The number of internet users whose mailboxes
are currently protected by Spamhaus DNSBLs now exceeds 1.4 Billion.”).
25

See id.

26

See Spam Scams, SPAMLINKS, http://spamlinks.net/scams.htm (last visited Jan. 17,
2011) (listing and describing common spam scams)
7
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legislators, have done much toward maintaining e-mail as a useful
resource.27 Nevertheless, the current state of the law denies those who
have been block listed – spammers and non-spammers alike – adequate
due process with respect to their dealings with block list operators, or a
guaranteed right to judicial redress.28
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF SPAM
[11] To better understand the problems associated with 47 U.S.C. §
230, it is instructive to review the history and current status of spam, and
the efforts of those who seek to minimize it. Originally, the Internet and
e-mail were intended as educational, government tools.29 In fact, the
Acceptable Use Policy of the National Science Foundation restricted
commercial use of the Internet well into the 1990’s.30 Following the
removal of the Acceptable Use Policy restriction, commercial exploitation
of the Internet, including electronic mail and the spread of unsolicited bulk
commercial messages, which quickly earned the nickname spam,31
erupted.32

27

See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (“CAN-SPAM”); SPAMHELP, http://www.spamhelp.
org (last visited Jan. 17, 2010) (providing information on available software and
legislation that allow users to avoid spam).
28

See discussion infra Part IX.A. Often, victims of improperly block listings wind up on
block lists because of an accidental inclusion or as a means of exercising leverage over an
ISP to stop facilitating spamming. See Brooks, supra note 5.
29

See Timothy Coughlan, Applying the U.S. Postal Service Statutes to E-Mail
Transmissions, 25 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 375, 379-83 (1999); Keith J.
Epstein & Bill Tancer, Enforcement of Use Limitations by Internet Service Providers:
“How To Stop That Hacker, Cracker, Spammer, Spoofer, Flamer, Bomber”, 19
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 661, 663 (1997).
30

See Epstein & Tancer, supra note 29; see also A Timeline of NSF History, NAT’L SCI.
FOUND., http://www.nsf.gov/about/history/timeline90s.jsp#1990s (last visited Jan. 17,
2011).
31

See DAVID CRYSTAL, LANGUAGE AND THE INTERNET 53 (2001) (“The origin of the
term [“spam”] lies in a 1970 Monty Python sketch in which a cafe waitress describes the
available dishes to two customers, and culinary variation is introduced by an increasing
8
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[12] Although the first spam e-mail reportedly occurred as early as
1978,33 the first widely recognized spam occurrence transpired on March
5, 1994 on Usenet, the topical message boards mirrored across the
Internet.34 It was not until the late 1990’s that e-mail spam, a scourge of
users and network administrators alike, began to build serious
momentum.35 As the frequency and amount of spam increased, consumers
pressured service providers, software vendors and the legal system to
reduce the burden, particularly because of the costs consumers incurred.36
[13] Prior to the development of spam e-mail, there had been little need
to develop anti-spam legislation because the marketers of offline, bulk
commercial mail bore the costs associated with standard mail delivery.37

reliance on spam . . . .”); see also Roger Allan Ford, Preemption of State Spam Laws by
the Federal CAN-SPAM Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 355, 355 (2005) (“More than thirteen
billion spam messages are sent per day.”).
32

JONATHAN EZOR, CLICKING THROUGH: A SURVIVAL GUIDE FOR BRINGING YOUR
COMPANY ONLINE 138-39 (2000) (explaining the explosive growth of unsolicited
commercial e-mail by way of a hypothetical that illustrates the high rate of return on
investment that cannot exist with traditional mail services); see also Richard M. Smith,
The Web Bug FAQ, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 11, 1999),
http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Marketing/web_bug.html (explaining mass e-mail marketers’
use of “web bugs,” invisible graphics that collect real time information about the
effectiveness of an advertisement, including deletion of addresses that do not view the
content).
33

Tony Long, May 1, 1978: Spam, From Novelty to Nuisance in a Couple of Decades,
WIRED, (May 1, 2007) http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2007/05/
dayintech_0501; see also Brad Templeton, Reaction to the DEC Spam of 1978,
TEMPLETONS, http://www.templetons.com/brad/spamreact.html (last visited Jan. 17,
2011).
34

Glyn Moody, Spam’s Tenth Birthday Today, NETCRAFT (Mar. 5, 2004),
http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2004/03/05/spams_tenth_birthday_today.html.
35

Cf. Amy G. Marino, Is Spam the Rock of Sisyphus?: Whether the Can-Spam Act and Its
Global Counterparts Will Delete Your E-Mail, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (2005).
36

See id. (noting that most Internet users paid by the minute).

37

See id. at 1024-25.
9
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The development of spam e-mail provided marketers with the opportunity
to shift the costs to the consumer, thereby allowing the marketers to send
more solicitations with less overhead.38 Eventually, the burdens stemming
from the rising levels of commercial bulk e-mail drove Internet users to
seek legal remedy.39
[14] The legal system had difficulty curbing the growth of spam, as
there were few cases on point, and the little precedent that did exist, was
relatively unclear.40 Initially, spam recipients and ISPs seeking legal
redress were limited to adapting existing offline doctrines to address the
unauthorized use of servers and computers as bulk e-mail conduits.41 But,
the need to adapt the existing law quickly became apparent.42
[15] In early cases, plaintiffs crafted their cause of action through
analogy to existing doctrine, for example, trespass to chattel, because the
law had not yet established a cause of action for claims stemming from
commercial bulk e-mailings.43 While some trespass to chattel claims,
particularly those brought by ISPs, were successful,44 other cases, such as

38

Id. at 1025.

39

See id. at 1025-29.

40

See generally id. (discussing the development of Federal and State anti-spam
legislation, and constitutional and procedural concerns associated with claims against
spammers).
41

See id. at 1025-26, 1029.

42

See id. at 1024-26.

43

See, e.g., CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (S.D.
Ohio 1997) (claiming trespass to chattels); see also Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie
Inc., C-98 JW PVT ENE, C 98-20064 JW, 1998 WL 388389, *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16,
1998) (claiming trespass to chattel, breach of contract and fraud and misrepresentation).
44

See, e.g., Compuserve, 962 F. Supp. at 1023.
10
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Intel v. Hamidi,45 found United States courts less than willing to extend
the doctrine to e-mail. The difficulty and uncertainty associated with
arguing these claims, made it clear that a more specific legislative
approach might be needed.46
III. THE RISE OF SPECIFIC ANTI-SPAM LEGISLATION
[16] Eventually, legislatures took up the effort against spam, both in
individual states,47 and at the federal level via the CAN-SPAM Act.48

45

71 P.3d 296, 308 (Cal. 2003) (holding that a former employee who sent thousands of
critical e-mail messages to his ex-employer’s e-mail system was not liable for trespass to
chattels).
46

Similarly, the issue of addressing cybersquatting through traditional trademark law led
to the passage of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in 1999 (“ACPA”).
See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501,
app. I 1501A-521 (1999), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125. Trademark holders who believed
their rights were violated sued under theories of unfair competition, infringement, and
dilution, attempting to hold domain name registrars liable for issuing infringing domain
names. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 98687 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding a domain name registrar not liable for registering a domain
that allegedly infringed the plaintiff’s trademarks); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton,
189 F.3d 868, 880-81 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding against an office supplies company in its
trademark dilution claim against a registrant of domains based upon last names that
included “Avery” and “Dennison”); Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t
Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding in favor of an entertainment services
provider that brought a trademark infringement case against a video rental chain for using
“MovieBuff” as a domain name). In response to the growing number of cases on these
issues and the lack of specific statutory guidance, Congress enacted the ACPA. See Pub.
L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, app. I 1501A-521 (1999), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125;
Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 778 (8th Cir. 2004). ACPA added a new section
to the Lanham Act, the United States federal trademark law, which established a private
cause of action and statutory damages “bad faith” cybersquatting. See 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d) (2006).
47

See Summary, SPAM LAWS, http://www.spamlaws.com/state/summary.shtml (last
visited Jan. 17, 2011) (providing a state-by-state summary of spam laws).
48

Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (“CAN-SPAM”).
11
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Before Congress enacted CAN-SPAM, critics expressed doubt that
lawmakers would be able to reduce the deluge of spam infiltrating users
inboxes.49 The criticism arose for two reasons. First, the Internet is
international and thus purely local, and even national, law would have
little affect against offshore spammers.50 Second, spam is largely the
province of small, unsophisticated, or “guerrilla” marketers, rather than
large corporations with both assets at risk and legal departments to advise
them regarding compliance with the law.51 Critics also noted the practical
challenge of identifying what “spam” truly is; one user’s unsolicited
commercial bulk e-mail message may be another’s “just what I wanted”
offer.52
[17] Anti-spam statutes have in large part sidestepped the definitional
issues and instead focus on labeling advertisements, prohibiting
misleading techniques (such as disguising the sender’s identity or
disregarding unsubscribe requests by unwilling recipients), and requiring
proper sender identification.53 Even with this approach, defining what
constitutes advertising poses its own problems, since an e-mail message
may include both advertisement and informational material.54 How, for

49

See Declan McCullagh, FTC Chair: Antispam Proposals Lacking, CNET NEWS (Aug.
19, 2003), http://news.com.com/FTC+chair+Antispam+proposals+lacking/2100-1028_35065739.html.
50

See David Chartier, First Spam Felony Conviction Upheld: No Free Speech to Spam,
ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 2, 2008), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/03/firstspam-felony-conviction-upheld-no-free-speech-to-spam.ars (alluding to CAN-SPAM's
limited reach).
51

See Paul Roberts, EarthLink Wins $16 Million in Spam Case, PCWORLD (May 7,
2003), http://pcworld.com/article/id,110627-page,1/article.html.
52

See Cindy Cohn & Annalee Newitz, Noncommercial Email Lists: Collateral Damage
in the Fight Against Spam, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 2004),
http://www.eff.org/wp/noncommercial-email-lists-collateral-damage-fight-against-spam.
53

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7704 (2006) (enacting part of CAN-SPAM).

54

See Erika Hallace Kikuchi, Spam in A Box: Amending Can-Spam & Aiming Toward A
Global Solution, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 263, 268 (2004).
12
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example, should the law characterize a newsletter that includes legitimate
articles separated by sponsor advertisements? The advertisements
themselves may be unsolicited, and the volume of the newsletter might
lend itself to a definition of “bulk,” but the overall publication may not
qualify as “spam” in most recipients’ views.55
[18] Enforcement is another major hurdle confronting anti-spam
legislation.56 A proposed statute intended to regulate spam must address
issues of jurisdiction (interstate and international), both to bring the
alleged spammer before the court, and to enforce any assessed penalties.57
Before establishing jurisdiction, though, the enforcement agency or
litigant must identify the spammer.58 This is not a simple process, as the
Internet enables both anonymity59 and pseudonymity,60 factors that can be
further complicated by the spamming tactic of falsifying an e-mail’s
identifying information.61 While some enforcement methods may work, it

55

See Grant Yang, Can-Spam: A First Step to No-Spam, 4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1
(2004).
56

Meyer Potashman, International Spam Regulation & Enforcement: Recommendations
Following the World Summit on the Information Society, 29 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
323, 332-37 (2006); see also Yang, supra note 52.
57

Elizabeth A. Alongi, Note, Has the U.S. Canned Spam?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 263, 281-84
(2004); see also Kenneth C. Amaditz, Canning "Spam" in Virginia: Model Legislation to
Control Junk E-Mail, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 52-60 (1999).
58

See Amaditz, supra note 57, at 60.

59

See, e.g., Anonymous Web Surfing with Anonymizer Universal, ANONYMIZER,
http://www.anonymizer.com/universal (last visited Jan. 17, 2011) (discussing a product
that enables anonymous Internet browsing); see also Anonymity Online, TOR,
http://torproject.org/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2011) (discussing an anonymous Internet
communications system).
60

Andreas Pfitzmann & Marit Hansen, Anonymity, Unlinkability, Unobservability,
Pseudonymity, and Identity Management – A Consolidated Proposal for Terminology,
13-14 (2005), available at http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/terminology.pdf
(defining pseudonymity as “the use of pseudonyms as IDs”).
61

See Roberts, supra note 51.
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is still relatively simple for even an in-jurisdiction spammer to hide his
tracks.62 Also, spammers frequently change ISPs and accounts as tracking
efforts get closer to them.63 Furthermore, even if found, a spammer may
well be judgment proof or have otherwise hidden his assets.64 Finally,
even in jurisdictions where spamming is a felony, as in Virginia,65
convictions are rare.66
IV. BLOCK LISTS AND SPAM FILTERS: SELF-REGULATION
THROUGH TECHNOLOGY
[19] Before legislators took up the fight against spam, Internet users
employed two main methods to address the problem: block listing and
filtering.67 Block listing began as a way to educate the public and name

62

See Charles Arthur, Will Convicting Five Major Spammers Put an End to Spam?,
GUARDIAN (June 24, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/jun/24/spamnewly-asked-questions (discussing United States based spammers using foreign servers
to distribute their spam).
63

See Roberts, supra note 51 (describing how EarthLink pursued spammer Howard
Carmack and “shut down several accounts he used”).
64

See Associated Press, AOL Wants to Dig for Gold in Spammer's Parents' Back Yard,
FOXNEWS.COM (Aug. 17, 2006), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,208712,00.html
(explaining AOL's plans to dig in the backyard of the parents of a convicted spammer
who was facing a $12.8 million judgment in hopes of finding gold and platinum bars he
might have buried there).
65

VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.3:1 (Supp. 2010) (identifying spamming as a misdemeanor,
or, if transmission or revenue exceeds certain levels, a class 6 felony).
66

See, e.g., Chartier, supra note 50 (discussing the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision to
uphold the 2008 conviction of Jeremy Jaynes, the first felony spamming conviction in the
United States). At least one major convicted spammer has been imprisoned. Hibah
Yousuf, ‘Godfather of Spam’ Going to Prison, CNNMONEY.COM (Nov. 24, 2009),
http://money.cnn.com/2009/11/24/technology/King_of_spam_lawsuit_fraud_Ralsky/inde
x.htm (discussing the November 2009 conviction of Alan Ralsky under the federal CANSPAM Act, and his subsequent fifty-one month sentence).
67

See Neil Schwartzman, Trench Warfare in the Age of the Laser-Guided Missile, (Jan.
16, 2007, 7:25 AM), http://www.circleid.com/posts/anti_spam_virus_trench_warfare/.
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(thereby effectively shaming) the most egregious spammers.68 Paul
Vixie’s “Real-time Blackhole List” was one of the first block list
resources.69
[20] At the outset, Vixie’s block list was a reference users employed to
identify and block senders on a sender-by-sender basis.70 As Internet and
e-mail usage expanded to include the everyday consumer, and spam
became a more widespread problem, the Internet community began to
scale up its blocking efforts.71 The block list evolved into a downloadable,
standardized tool that ISPs could connect to their servers, thereby
importing the entire block list (which was regularly updated), and block all
e-mail from senders the list designated as spammers.72
[21] Several block lists are volunteer-maintained, such as The
Spamhaus Project (“Spamhaus”), which is based in the United Kingdom.73
Others, like Julian Haight’s SpamCop, were originally volunteer efforts,
but were eventually sold to commercial e-mail security firms.74 Vendors,
such as Symantec, offer software that incorporates block lists, running

68

See What is a DNSBL?, DNSBL.INFO, http://www.dnsbl.info/, (last visited Jan. 27,
2011) (“DNS Blacklists have a rather long history in web terms, with the first one being
created in 1997. Called the RBL, its purpose was to block spam email and to educate
Internet service providers and other websites about spam and its related problems.”)
69

See Robert McMillan, What Will Stop Spam? Paul Vixie Hopes His Realtime
Blackhole List Will at Least Be a Start, SUNWORLD (Dec. 1997), http://sunsite.uakom.sk/
sunworldonline/swol-12-1997/swol-12-vixie.html (interviewing Paul Vixie regarding the
development of his Realtime Blackhole List).
70

See id.

71

See id.

72

See id.

73

See About Spamhaus, SPAMHAUS, http://www.spamhaus.org/ (last visited Jan. 17,
2010).
74

See SpamCop FAQ: What is SpamCop’s History?, SPAMCOP.NET,
http://www.spamcop.net/fom-serve/cache/109.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
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either on an ISP’s private mail server or remotely via a shared application
service provider (“ASP”) model.75
[22] Block lists populate their spammer databases in a number of ways.
One method is that list managers set up accounts or networks on popular
ISPs that “probe” for spam but are otherwise unused.76 Spammers using a
technique called “dictionary attacks,” in which spammers send bulk
commercial messages to every conceivable combination of numbers and
letters for possible e-mail addresses, unknowingly include the trolling
accounts.77 Once the account receives a commercial message, the
message’s details are added to the overall block list.78
[23] Another method focuses on the servers that send the e-mail.
Outgoing e-mail servers may either reject messages coming from outside
their network or subscriber population, or pass the outside messages along
to their destinations.79 Those that indiscriminately pass along messages
are “open relays,” and spammers frequently utilize them to disguise the
origin of unsolicited advertising.80 Given this risk, anti-spam proponents
have sought to encourage the elimination of open relays through the
creation of public open relay block lists,81 as well as other block lists of

75

Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam, Advanced Antispam and Email Security Solution for
the Enterprise, SYMANTEC, http://eval.veritas.com/mktginfo/enterprise/fact_sheets/entfactsheet_brightmail_antispam_6.0_08-2004.en-us.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
76

Nathan Segal, Filtering Spam with Blocklists, SMALL BUS. COMPUTING.COM, (Sept. 22,
2002), http://www.smallbusinesscomputing.com/webmaster/article.php/1467881.
77

See
Dictionary
Attack
Spam,
ONLYMYEMAIL
ANTI-SPAM
BLOG,
http://blog.onlymyemail.com/dictionary-attack-spam/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
78

See Segal, supra note 76.

79

See Joseph Neubauer, Fortify Your Email Transport – Part 2, MICROSOFT (June 21,
2002), http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc750375.aspx.
80

See id.

81

See Matthew Broersma, Spam Project Pulls Plug, Open-Relay Volunteer Monitors
Hang It Up, COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 21, 2006), http://www.computerworld.com/s/
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similar outside-access exploits.82 Even when a server is not open to the
public, if its authorized users utilize it to send spam, the server, and all of
its customers, spammers and non-spammers alike, may be added to block
lists, causing problems for everyone.83 This possibility is of particular
importance to ISPs that offer connectivity services to company networks
as well as individual users.84 ISPs that use technical means to disable
connecting mail servers in order to prevent the ISP from being deemed
“spammer friendly,” can inconvenience legitimate high-volume mailers
and corporate customers.85
[24] A third method used to populate block lists is collaborative
reporting.86 Through this method, users report spam to block lists, either
through an e-mail message to the operators,87 or via an on-screen button in
an e-mail program.88 Depending on how the block list functions, the
information may be immediately added to the block list or investigated

article/9006578/Spam_project_pulls_plug (discussing a former anti-spam blacklist
service, the Open Relay Database (“ORDB”), which distributed a blacklist of mail
servers that allowed open relays and were therefore prone to spamming).
82

See, e.g., XBL Advisory, Exploits Block List, SPAMHAUS, http://www.spamhaus.
org/XBL/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2011).
83

See Cohn & Newitz, supra note 52.

84

See id.

85

See id.

86

See SpamCop FAQ: How Does SpamCop Reporting Work?, SPAMCOP.NET,
http://www.spamcop.net/fom-serve/cache/3.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
87

See id. (describing how the SpamCop service utilizes user reporting to identify spam,
then communicates with the spammer’s service provider).
88

See How It Works, CLOUDMARK DESKTOPONE, http://www.cloudmarkdesktop.com/en/
home (last visited Jan. 17, 2011) (discussing Cloudmark DesktopOne, a spam-blocker
that surveys user feedback in Microsoft Outlook and Outlook Express and uses the
feedback to generate block lists).
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further.89 The advantage of collaboration is that it extends the net through
which spam is caught far beyond the reach of list manager. With some
additional tools, the community collaborating on reporting ideally gets the
benefit of stronger and more accurate spam blocking.90
[25] In parallel with the rise of shared block lists, e-mail programs also
offer internal spam filters.91 Microsoft’s Outlook e-mail program, for
example, began offering a “junk mail” filter with its Outlook 98 version,
which based its filtering on a combination of suspect terms and user
feedback (i.e. labeling a message as “junk mail,” which thereafter routed
the sender’s messages to a Junk Mail or Deleted Items folder).92
[26] As spammers’ e-mail modification techniques become more
sophisticated (including falsifying sender information), and adapt to beat
the simpler blocking methods, software-based filters must incorporate
more heuristic methodologies, such as analyzing words, punctuation,
sender information, mail server information, and other elements to score
incoming messages as spam.93 This method, called Bayesian filtering,94 is
based on work of the eighteenth century theoretician Rev. Thomas

89

See SpamCop FAQ: How Does SpamCop Reporting Work?, supra note 86.

90

According to the Cloudmark software program on the author’s computer, for example,
as of October 3, 2006, the Cloudmark Desktop collaborative filter had checked
3,585,957,863 messages, with 75,214,674 spam messages “blocked by the community”
and 1,729,376,093 “automatically stopped.”
91

See OL98: How to Filter Junk and Adult Content E-mail, MICROSOFT (Mar. 6, 2001),
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=182251.
92

See id.

93

See Paul Hoffman & Dave Crocker, UNSOLICITED BULK E-MAIL: MECHANISMS FOR
CONTROL, INTERNET MAIL CONSORTIUM, (May 4, 1998), http://www.imc.org/ubesol.html; Paul Graham, A Plan for Spam, PAUL GRAHAM (Aug. 2002),
http://www.paulgraham. com/spam.html.
94

See Hoffman & Crocker, supra note 93; Graham, supra note 93.
18

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 2

Bayes.95 Once the software scores the incoming message, the user or ISP
may choose whether to label a message as suspected spam, redirect it to a
dedicated spam folder, or automatically delete it.96
V. SPAM(MER) LABELING AND THE CHALLENGE OF FALSE POSITIVES
[27] The processes that filter messages and identify spam are not
perfect. The first challenge is definitional.97 Just as United States
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart famously opined about
pornography, “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of
material I understand to be [hard-core pornography] . . . .[b]ut I know it
when I see it,” definitions of objectionable spam vary.98 The United States
Department of Education Institute of Education Services defines spam as
“electronic junk mail or junk newsgroup postings. . . . [with s]ome people
defin[ing] spam even more generally as any unsolicited e-mail.”99 Trend
Micro, the vendor of the Mail Abuse Prevention System (“MAPS”),
provides that:
“[a]n electronic message is “spam” IF: (1) the recipient’s
personal identity and context are irrelevant because the

95

See Sue Mosher, Bayesian Spam Filters, WINDOWS IT PRO, (Feb. 18, 2003),
http://www.windowsitpro.com/article/exchange-server/bayesian-spam-filters.aspx.
See
generally THOMAS BAYES, AN ESSAY TOWARDS SOLVING A PROBLEM IN THE DOCTRINE
OF CHANCES (1763), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS 370, 370-418,
available at http://rstl.royalsociety publishing.org/content/53/370.full.pdf+html.
96

See Paul Graham, Better Bayesian Filtering, PAUL GRAHAM (Jan. 2003),
http://paulgraham.com/better.html.
97

See generally Stefanie Olsen, One Man’s Spam is Another’s Art, CNET NEWS, (July
26, 2006), http://news.cnet.com/One-mans-spam-is-anothers-art/2100-1025_3-6098479.
html.
98

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).

99

Weaving a Secure Web Around Education: A Guide to Technology Standards and
Security, NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/secureweb/
glossary.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2011) (emphasis in original).
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message is equally applicable to many other potential
recipients; AND (2) the recipient has not verifiably granted
deliberate, explicit, and still-revocable permission for it to
be sent; AND (3) the transmission and reception of the
message appears to the recipient to give a disproportionate
benefit to the sender.”100
Finally, the Office for Internet Safety provides a more general definition:
“[s]pam refers to unwanted e-mail, usually of a commercial nature, sent
out in bulk to an indiscriminate set of recipients.”101
[28] Certain marketing organizations, like the Direct Marketing
Association, do not provide a formal definition of spam, but rather
guidelines on responsible e-mail marketing.102 Similarly, while some laws
define spam directly,103 others simply list permissible and prohibited
activities.104 Beyond the formal definitions, each user has his own idea of
what constitutes unwanted “junk” e-mail.105 While few definitions of

100

Trend Micro, Definition of Spam, MAIL-ABUSE, http://www.mail-abuse.com/spam_
def.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).
101

Jargon Buster, supra note 1.

102

See generally Council for Responsible E-mail, E-mail Delivery Best Practices for
Marketers and List Owners, DIRECT MARKETING ASS’N (Oct. 2005), http://www.thedma.org/antispam/EmailBPFINAL.pdf.
103

E.g., 30 ILL. COMP. STAT. 500/25-70 (Ann. West 2009) (defining spam as “unsolicited
electronic mail advertisements”); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 511/5 (Ann. West 2008)
(extending the definition of spam to “any electronic mail advertisement that (i) is
addressed to a recipient with whom the initiator does not have a prior or existing business
or personal relationship and (ii) is not sent at the request of or with the express consent of
the recipient”).
104

See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699.
105

See Carlton Vogt, Spam: The Name’s the Same, But We’re Still Not Sure What It
Means, IT WORLD (Apr. 10, 2001), http://www.itworld.com/Man/2695/IWD010406
opethics/.
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spam include the act of making open relays available (as opposed to
utilizing them), operators of vulnerable servers may also find themselves
blocked by the same tools that seek out spammers.106
[29] With so many possible definitions of spam, it is little wonder that
automated software-based tools cannot identify e-mail as spam in a way
with which everyone, particularly the sender, may agree. Of notable
controversy is how a software program determines whether a
communication is “unsolicited.”107 Consider the situation where a
professional attends a trade show and places his business card, which
identifies his e-mail address, into a drawing for a DVD player.108 If the
professional does not win the prize, but the vendor whose booth sponsored
the drawing uses the e-mail address to send the professional information
on the vendor’s products, is that an unsolicited commercial message?109
For that matter, is there a “prior or existing business or personal
relationship” as required under the Illinois statutes?110
[30] The vendor likely may argue that willingly providing a business
card containing an e-mail address in the context of a tradeshow booth
represents consent to receive e-mail communications, since the vendor

106

See id. (discussing the need for a formal definition of spam, which allows the reader to
draw the inference that without such a definition, some spammers will avoid the
“spammer” tag and some non-spammers will be wrongfully labeled).
107

See generally L. Pelletier et al., Adaptive Filtering of SPAM , U. ALA. BIRMINGHAM, 2
(2004), available at http://www.cis.uab.edu/zhang/Spam-mining-papers/Adaptive.
Filtering.of.Spam.pdf.
108

See Terry Zink, Does Handing Out Business Cards Constitute Opt-in?, TERRY ZINK’S
CYBER SECURITY BLOG, (Oct. 13, 2010, 9:32 AM), http://blogs.msdn.com/b/tzink/
archive/2010/10/13/does-handing-out-business-cards-constitute-opt-in.aspx (suggesting
that this situation implicates a separate category of "gray mail").
109

See id.

110

See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 511/5
(defining “unsolicited electronic mail
advertisement”); see also 30 ILL. COMP. STAT. 500/25-70 (describing spam as
“unsolicited electronic marl advertisements”).
21

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 2

would not offer the DVD player without a reason (i.e. building a contact
list).111 But the professional may only have been interested in the DVD
player, not the vendor’s products, and he may not even remember having
left a card in that particular vendor’s booth. Thus, it would not be
unexpected if the professional views the message as unwanted, and even
unsolicited, and designates the message as spam.112 This designation
could promulgate further action, such as the professional or his ISP
labeling the vendor as a spammer, which may then lead to the vendor’s
placement on multiple network block lists. Thus, it is possible that the
opinion of a single individual or organization may block a sender’s e-mail
from reaching billions of users throughout the world.113
[31] Even when a user does not directly identify a message as spam, an
automated filter operating on pre-existing rules and methods may
improperly tag a non-commercial or solicited message as such.114 If the

111

See Zink, supra note 108.

112

See id.

113

Cf. Press Release, Cloudmark, Cloudmark Wants You to Show Us Your Spam in New
Online Video Contest (June 22, 2010), available at http://www.cloudmark.com/en/
press/releases/2010-06-22-cloudmark-wants-you-to-show-us-your-spam-in-new-onlinevideo-contest (claiming that “Cloudmark solutions protect more than one billion
subscribers for the world’s largest networks, including AT&T, Comcast, MySpace, NTT,
Swisscom, and Time Warner Cable”); Symantec Brightmail Message Filter, SYMANTEC,
http://www.symantec.com/business/brightmail-message-filter (last visited Jan. 17, 2011)
(“Brightmail Message Filter protects over 800 million mailboxes and over 200 service
providers globally.”); Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), Spamhaus SBL, SPAMHAUS,
http://www.spamhaus.org/faq/answers.lasso?section=Spamhaus%20SBL#7 (last visited
Jan. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Spamhaus SBL] (stating that “as of October 2009 the
[Spamhaus Block List] user base exceeded 1,467,562,000 internet user mailboxes”).
Because ISPs and network administrators often use multiple spam-blocking technologies,
it is likely the number of protected computers overlap. See Justin Fielding, Can Botnets
Be Beaten?, TECHREPUBLIC (Feb. 19, 2008), http://blogs.techrepublic.com.com/
networking/index.php?cat=147&submit=view&paged=2. For example, both Spamhaus
and Cloudmark block lists filter the author’s Touro Law Center e-mail account.
114

See Éloïse Gratton, Dealing with Unsolicited Commercial Emails: A Global
Perspective, 7 J. INTERNET L. 3, 3 (2004).
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initial message is not spam, blocking the sender’s e-mails is essentially a
false accusation with significant impact.
[32] Because messages scored as spam are typically kept from their
intended destination (the recipient’s inbox) and often routed to the deleted
items or junk mail folder, or otherwise dumped in the "bit bucket,"115 the
sender may never know the recipient did not receive the message.116 Also,
the intended recipient may not always know which e-mail messages the
spam filter routes away from his inbox, since, depending on the filter’s
configuration, the message may end up in his e-mail’s spam or trash
folder, or on his network or ISP mail server, to which he may not have
access.117 Moreover, even if the improperly blocked messages are on the
recipient’s computer, if he neglects to check the spam folder or empties
the trash folder without reviewing the contents, he will remain unaware of
the mistake.118 In this way, even local false positives are problematic,
particularly if the sender’s identity, rather than the message’s contents,
cause the blocking.119 Furthermore, if the false positive happens across a
multi-network basis, both detection and remediation may be much more
difficult.

115

See Bit Bucket, CATB, http://www.catb.org/jargon/html/B/bit-bucket.html (last visited
Jan. 16, 2011) (defining “bit bucket” as a computing term for the process of deleting
unwanted information and noting the term might have come from the container into
which the chads from computing punch cards are dropped).
116

See Gratton, supra note 114.

117

See What Is a Spam Filter?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-spamfilter.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
118

See What Is a False Positive?, POPFILE, http://getpopfile.org/docs/glossary:
falsepositive (last visited Jan. 26, 2011).
119

See id.
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VI. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF FALSE POSITIVES
AND WRONGFUL LABELING
[33] For a casual e-mail exchange, a blocked message or account can be
inconvenient. On the other hand, there may be times when e-mail receipt
is mission-critical. A false positive from a spam filter or block list can
make the difference between winning a bid for a government contract,120
cause a litigant to miss a court-imposed pleadings deadline,121 or
otherwise cost time, money or both.
[34] In the commercial context, the risks can be both harder to quantify,
but much greater in scope. Even the most zealous anti-spam advocates
understand and acknowledge that a solicited commercial message may be
proper.122 Spamhaus clarifies the definition of spam, noting that “[s]pam
is an issue about consent, not content. Whether the Unsolicited Bulk Email
(“UBE”) message is an advert, a scam, porn, a begging letter or an offer of

120

See GRAYSON COUNTY, TEX., INSTRUCTIONS FOR ELECTRONIC BID SUBMISSIONS,
available at http://www.co.grayson.tx.us/Purchasing/PurchaseBidSub.htm (last visited
Jan. 16, 2011); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 6902(9) (2010) (“‘Electronic bid’
means the bidder . . . submits all documentation . . . only through an electronic process to
an identified secure electronic mail account that will not be opened by the Office until the
close of the bidding period. In this process, no hard copy documentation shall be
submitted to the Office prior to the award of the contract.”).
121

See, e.g., Eric Goldman, “Spam Filter Ate My Electronic Filing Notice” Plaintiffs Get
Another Chance – Shuey v. Schwab, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Dec. 1, 2009, 10:15
AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/12/spam_filter_ate.htm (discussing an
unpublished Third Circuit decision involving allegations of failing to receive a court’s
electronically filed order due to a spam filter); see also N.Y. ST. ATT’Y GEN., SERVICE ON
THE OAG BY E-MAIL (2008), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/serviceag_email.html
(providing instructions for serving the Attorney General via e-mail under New York’s
Filing by Electronic Means pilot program); N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYSTEM, NEW YORK
STATE COURTS E-FILING (NYSCEF), available at https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/fbem/
home.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2011) (permitting “the filing of legal papers by electronic
means”).
122

The Definition of Spam, SPAMHAUS, http://www.spamhaus.org/definition.html (last
visited Nov. 1, 2010).
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a free lunch, the content is irrelevant - if the message was sent unsolicited
and in bulk then the message is spam.”123
[35] Although definitions sharply differ, most definitions of spam
include some element of consent and/or solicitation.124 Spamhaus, for
example, indicates that a message is solicited when “the recipient has . . .
verifiably granted deliberate, explicit, and still-revocable permission for it
to be sent.”125 In contrast, the Direct Marketing Association provides a
much broader view on consent. The Direct Marketing Association
indicates that a recipient may provide affirmative consent to opt-in to
receive commercial messages, or consent to opt-out of receiving
commercial messages.126
[36] If a block list shared across users or ISPs generates a false positive,
the false positive can keep a solicited message from reaching not only a
single recipient, but also an entire list of recipients.127 Consider an online
direct marketer that uses its own double opt-in list for its e-mail campaigns
to ensure that it has affirmative consent for its messages.128 Given the
quality of its list and the nature of its mailings, the marketer typically
enjoys a five percent average response rate to its direct e-mail

123

Id.

124

See, e.g., id.

125

See id.

126

See Council for Responsible E-mail, supra note 102, at 3 (identifying “double opt-in,”
“confirmed opt-in,” and “opt-in” as forms of affirmative consent, and identifying “optout” as a form of consent). “Affirmative consent accompanied by clear and conspicuous
notice provides a more highly qualified level of permission from recipients, which may
help reduce the potential for spam complaints that could interfere with e-mail delivery.”
Id.
127

See, e.g., Symantec Brightmail Message Filter, supra note 113.

128

See Council for Responsible E-mail, supra note 102, at 3. Double opt-in occurs when
“[a] user has elected to receive e-mail newsletters or stand alone commercial messages.
A confirmation e-mail is then sent to the user to which he/she must reply . . . before the
list owner may add [him/her] to [his] list.” Id.
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solicitations.129
Assume that, because a well-regarded block list
incorrectly lists the marketer as a spammer, the ISPs for a significant
number of users on the marketer’s list block the marketer’s e-mails.130
This may result in a drastic drop in the solicitations response rate.
Complicating the matter is the fact that if the messages are filtered rather
than bounced back to the sender, the marketer’s only indication that it is
on a block list is the response rate, because it does not receive an external
notice.131 Further, even if some messages bounce back, the marketer may
not have the tools or sophistication to properly measure and track the
problem down to a particular set of ISPs or block list(s).132
[37] The above hypothetical is not limited to direct marketers. The
Interactive Advertising Bureau (“IAB”) has published an entire guide to email deliverability, which states that “[m]ore than 20% of legitimate
marketing messages are incorrectly identified as spam by server and client
level spam filtering, so chances are that if you aren’t watching it closely
then you have deliverability problems.”133

129

How Can We Increase Our Email Marketing Response Rates?,
DESTINATIONCRM.COM (Dec. 9, 2002), http://www.destinationcrm.com/articles/
default.asp?ArticleID=2714 (stating that response rates to e-mail campaigns have been
reported as ranging anywhere from one to two percent to as high as twenty-five percent).
130

See Roderick Suganob, Spam Filters Do Generate False Positive, ASSOCIATED
CONTENT, (May 17. 2007), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/249172/spam_
filters?cat=35 (providing a parallel discussion about the issue of false positives and the
relationship between spam filters and marketers).
131

See id.

132

See id.

133

Marketer & Agency Guide to Email Deliverability, INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING
BUREAU, 3 (2006), http://www.iab.net/emaildeliverability; see also The IAB Releases an
Industry Guide to Email Deliverability, INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING BUREAU (OCT. 16,
2006),
http://www.iab.net/about_the_iab/recent_press_releases/press_release_archive/
press_release/5086.
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[38] The IAB suggests multiple methods for evaluating and dealing
with deliverability problems, including bounce reports, monitoring of email abuse discussion lists and careful review of data collection
methods.134 Given that the IAB’s members are among the larger, moreestablished (and therefore legally exposed) marketers, it is likely that the
processes by which these companies obtain and utilize lists are more
detailed and conservative than those used by more aggressive, smaller
marketers, emphasizing that the problems companies face with respect to
filters, block lists and e-mail non-delivery are truly great.135
VII. REMEDYING IMPROPER LISTING: THE LIMITS OF THE
SELF-REGULATORY APPROACH
[39] Given the Internet’s tradition of collaborative self-regulation, it
would seem appropriate that, in the event a sender is falsely designated as
a spammer, he should be able to remedy the situation without turning to
the courts.136 To address false positives from a user’s filter, many senders
include explicit instructions for recipients to add the sender to a
“whitelist,” that is, a list of approved e-mailers.137 But this process may

134

See id. at 8-12.

135

General Members, INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING BUREAU, http://www.iab.net/member_
center/1521/1534 (last visited Jan. 17, 2011) (displaying a members list that includes
Time Inc., Disney Interactive Media Group, and New York Times Digital).
136

See JULIAN DIBBELL, MY TINY LIFE: CRIME AND PASSION IN A VIRTUAL WORLD 11-28
(1998), available at http://www.lulu.com/items/volume_63/1070000/1070691/3/print/
1070691.pdf (recounting how an online virtual community created “law” and
“punishment” to respond to a member’s violation of the common social norm).
137

See Glossary, SINGAPORE SPAM CONTROL RESOURCE CENTRE,
http://www.spamcontrol.org.sg/glossary.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2011) (defining a
whitelist as the “[t]he opposite of a blacklist,” or a list of “‘good’ senders, so that all the
e-mails from [those senders] will be accepted”); Newsletter, GUIDESTAR.ORG (Aug.
2006), http://www.guidestar.org/news/newsletter/archive/aug_2006.jsp (“If you use spam
filters to protect your in-box, please take a moment right now to add
newsletter@guidestar.org to your e-mail address book, spam software whitelist, or mail
system whitelist. Adding the address will help ensure that you receive the Newsletter and
that your e-mail software displays HTML and images properly.”).
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not be easy for some users, as it requires their affirmative act.138 Further,
in light of the vast number of different software and ISP combinations
through which users receive e-mail,139 senders may find this approach less
than successful.140 The whitelist approach also has the weakness of
applying only to single users’ e-mail accounts or his personal spam
filtering setup, rather than a large number of potential recipients.141
[40] A more scalable approach involves obtaining placement on a large
ISP’s whitelist, with the hope that those users depending on the ISP to
block spam will benefit from the ISP’s “blessing” of the sender.142 While
this approach is more efficient than relying upon an individual’s whitelist,
it still requires a multi-step process, in which the sender likely identifies
those ISPs whose users represent significant percentages of the sender’s
mailing list, researches and complies with any ISP whitelist procedures,
and finally secures placement on the whitelist.143
[41] But, not every ISP maintains complete control over its global
whitelist; some leave the process in the hands of the users.144 Even under

138

See SINGAPORE SPAM CONTROL RESOURCE CENTRE, supra note 137.

139

See How To Make Sure Listeners Receive Your Email, PROMOSUITE INTERACTIVE,
http://www.listeneremail.com/email/emailhelp.htm (last updated Sept. 12, 2007).
140

See Press Release, Loren McDonald, NetlinkBlue, How To Get on a Whitelist,
available at http://www.netlinkblue.com/how-to-Get-Whitelist.asp (last visited Jan. 21,
2011) (“You probably have a line in your email message near the top, asking the recipient
to add your sending address to his or her address book or contact/safe-sender list. But,
that’s almost too late in the process.”).
141

See Matt Garrett, How E-mail Whitelists Work, ANTI SPAM FOR OUTLOOK,
http://antispamforoutlook.net/a80939-hoe-e-mail-whitelists-work.cfm (last visited Nov.
2, 2010).
142

See Stefan Pollard, Whitelisting: A Privilege Worth Earning, CLICKZ (May 9, 2007),
http://www.clickz.com/clickz/column/1698446/whitelisting-a-privilege-worth-earning.
143

See McDonald, supra note 140.

144

See Selecting Your Level of Spam Protection, EARTHLINK, www.earthlink.net/
webmail/help/earthlink/en_US/spamblocker/protection.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
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these ISP whitelist procedures, senders may faces significant procedural
burdens. AOL’s white list process includes technical, formatting and
procedural and policy requirements, including security obligations on the
sender’s own mail server.145 For an e-mail marketer, keeping up with
these separate requirements can be extremely onerous.146 In fact,
companies may not even consider the issue of whitelisting before
becoming subject to blocking. In either event, the whitelisting process is
imperfect, and companies, whether by mistake, or through critics’ or
competitors’ malice, may still end up on block lists.147
[42] Another approach is to obtain third-party certification as a nonspammer.148 For example, Return Path offers a commercial certification
service, with pricing ranging from $440 to $82,500 annually for
commercial mailers, depending on their monthly e-mail volume.149 The
requirements for this service are rather detailed,150 and the applicability,
though widespread, is far from universal.151 Here too, many e-mailers

145

See Conditions for Gaining Whitelisted Status, AOL POSTMASTER,
http://postmaster.aol.com/cgi-bin/whitelist/whitelist_guides.pl (last visited Oct. 28,
2010).
146

See id.

147

See Stefanie Olsen, Are Spam ‘Blocklists’ Going Too Far?, ZDNET (July 15, 2002),
http://m.zdnet.com.au/are-apam-blocklists-going-too-far-120266689.htm.
148

See Vincent Schiavone et al., Trusted Email Open Standard, A Comprehensive Policy
and Technology Proposal for Email Reform, ePRIVACY GROUP, 13, 17 (May 2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spam/Supplements/eprivacygp.pdf.
149

Great Value/High ROI, Reach More Subscribers with Richer Content, RETURN PATH,
http://www.returnpath.net/commercialsender/certification/pricing/ (last visited Jan. 16,
2011).
150

See generally Minimum Standards & Requirements for the Return Path Certification
Shared IP Program, RETURN PATH, http://www.returnpath.net/commercialsender/
certification/lib/documents/SharedIPsMinimumStandardsandRequirements.pdf
(last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
151

See Bus. Wire, Return Path Re-Launches the Bonded Sender Program with More
Rigorous Standards and New Name, Sender Score Certified, FIND ARTICLES (Apr. 18,
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may be unaware of the existence of third-party whitelisting, and for some,
the costs or efforts of compliance may seem too great, particularly when
they are not involved with direct e-mail marketing.
[43] The most efficient approach for a sender improperly included on a
block list or a spam filter is to request removal directly from that list or
filter.152 The first significant challenge is to verify that the sender is in
fact on that block list or filter.153 But this task is not always as simple as it
sounds, because while some operators, such as Spamhaus, make their
block lists public, others do not.154 A sender on a closed list may only
suspect it is there based on inference, examining which ISPs appear to
block the sender’s mail, and then attempting to determine what spam filter
or block list the ISPs may have in common.155 This, however, is an
inexact method and may not be determinative, especially if the ISPs use
multiple lists and filters to ensure complete coverage.156 A sender may

2006),
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_2006_April_18/ai_n26832534/
(“Sender Score Certified is the industry’s leading accreditation system, used by more
than 35,000 receiving domains, including MSN Hotmail, Windows Live Mail Beta and
Roadrunner, covering more than 250 million email mailboxes worldwide.”).
152

See Web Marketing Today, Spam Blacklist Removal, WILSON
http://www.wilsonweb.com/05/020529b.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).

WEB,

153

See Trend Micro, IP Address Removal Process, MAIL-ABUSE, http://www.mailabuse.com/removereq.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
154

See generally Blocklist Removal Center, SPAMHAUS, http://www.spamhaus.org/
lookup.lasso (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). In contrast, Brightmail is a “black box”-type
system, in which all e-mail goes in one end and spam-free e-mail comes out the other
end. See generally Data Sheet: Messaging Security, Symantec Brightmail Gateway,
SYMANTEC, http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/fact_sheets/b-symc_brightmail
_gateway_DS_20012004-1.en-us.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
155

See generally Blacklists: Major Blocks on the Path to the Inbox, G-LOCK SOFTWARE
(Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.glockeasymail.com/blacklists-blocks-path-to-inbox/.
156

See William K. Cole, Blacklists, Blocklists, DNSBL’s, and Survival: How To Survive
as a Non-combatant Emailer in the Spam Wars, SOLID CLUES CONSULTING,
http://www.scconsult.com/bill/dnsblhelp.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) (“Some [Mail
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have to make a best guess, investigate all possible lists and filters, and
then pursue removal options.157
[44] Yet even when a sender determines which block lists or filters
affect its messages, removal is far from certain, particularly in light of the
challenges regarding the various definitions of spam.158 As previously
discussed, spam for one party may be appropriate e-mail marketing for
another.159 Furthermore, a sender may consider single opt-in or even optout sufficient to prevent against the perception of spam, but block lists
may deem anything other than double (or verified) opt-in as spam, and
block the sender’s messages.160
[45] The next step is to determine the most appropriate method for
removal. Some block lists and filters provide a removal process (and even
contact senders regarding their removal from the list),161 but, because the
fight against spam is never-ending battle, a sender’s claim for removal

Transfer Agents, such as ISPs] use multiple DNSBL’s, weighted scoring, and other
techniques to decide whether to accept a piece of mail.”).
157

See Blacklists: Major Blocks on the Path to the Inbox, supra note 155.

158

See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.

159

See Cohn & Newitz, supra note 52; see also supra notes 97-106 and accompanying
text.
160

See Daniel Owen, An Application Agnostic Review of Current Spam Filtering
Techniques, DANIELOWEN.COM, 4 (Aug. 27, 2007), http://www.danielowen.com/agnostic
_spam. In some circumstances, senders may take comfort in compliance with applicable
laws such as CAN-SPAM, even though the block list providers dismiss the standards of
such laws as insufficient. See Steve Linford, United States Set To Legalize Spamming on
January 1, 2004, SPAMHAUS (Nov. 22, 2003), http://www.spamhaus.org/news.lasso?
article=150 (describing how the CAN-SPAM Act “legalizes spamming instead of
banning it”).
161

See NJABL.ORG, http://njabl.org/remove.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2011) (instructing
spammers on how to remove themselves from the Not Just Another Bogus List block
list).
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may face a presumption of invalidity.162 This presumption stems from the
negative views levied against spammers, and leads to the vicious reality
that claims of wrongful inclusion on block lists are likely to fall on deaf
ears.163
[46] The view against spam is so strong, that if a third party sends
unauthorized spam on behalf of a marketer, the marketer, because it has
benefited from the transmission, may receive the dubious title of
spammer.164 In fact, some lists will not even accept communications or
proposed evidence from accused or suspected spammers, rather the ISPs
with which the accused work must argue on their behalf.165 Moreover, if
the ISP is unwilling or unable to assist, or if the accused cannot otherwise
move the ISP to take action, the accused may face the dilemma of possibly
remaining on the block list or filter indefinitely, or switching ISPs, which
raises suspicion among anti-spam advocates.
[47] In light of the severe consequences senders face as a result of
having their e-mail messages blocked across numerous ISPs and networks,
it is no surprise that many accused spammers retain attorneys to advocate
on their behalf. Of concern is the possibility that block list and filter
operators may view such action negatively, believing that any sender
utilizing an attorney to press its case is an actual spammer using
unfounded legal threats to coerce removal from a list on which it properly
belongs.166 Further, even if a block list or filter operator entertains

162

See generally Road Runner Mail Blocks, ROAD RUNNER, http://security.rr.com/mail_
blocks.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
163

See ROKSO FAQ, supra note 3 (“Spammers are not people known for honesty; in fact
they are almost all con men, fraudsters and chronic liars.”).
164

See Alongi, supra note 57 (“Using prohibited spamming techniques to promote a
business is not allowed even if the business uses a third party spammer to send e-mail on
its behalf.”).
165

See generally Road Runner Mail Blocks, supra note 162.

166

See ROKSO FAQ, supra note 3 (“Spamhaus regularly receives letters from spammer’s
[sic] lawyers attempting to claim that all of a spammers [sic] records are in error and
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communication from an attorney on behalf of a sender, the operator is
likely under no obligation to act, and may nevertheless elect not to remove
the sender from its lists.
VIII. LITIGATION AS A REMEDY: CLAIMS, EXISTING CASES
AND EVOLVING DOCTRINE
[48] If a sender believes it is wrongfully included on a block list or
within a spam filter, but is unable to obtain removal after exhausting all
self-help processes and remedies, what are the sender’s remaining
options? Under United States law, senders have turned to the courts for
redress, requesting equitable relief, monetary damages, or both.167 A
sender’s strongest (potential) claims are defamation and intentional
interference with prospective business relationships.168 And, while the
courts, cases and claims vary, one almost universal defense block list and
filter operators invoke against a sender’s claim is the 47 U.S.C. § 230 safe
harbor.169
A. Wrongful Inclusion on Block Lists or Filters:
The Elements of Potential Claims
1. Defamation
[49] The Internet community is not alone in its negative view of
spamming.170 In fact, spamming is a crime in a number of jurisdictions.171

demanding all therefore be removed. [Spamhaus] naturally pay[s] little attention to such
requests.”).
167

See discussion infra Part VIII.B.

168

See infra Part VIII.A. The following analysis presupposes that a sender listed on a
block list is not a spammer.
169

See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).

170

See Mail Abuse Prevention Sys. LLC v. Black Ice Software, Inc., No. CV 788630,
2000 WL 34016435, at *7 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2000) (“‘Spammer’ and ‘spam’ are
disparaging labels in the Internet business community.”).
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Accordingly, a false designation on a block list carries the potential to
serve as an accusation of a crime.172
[50]

The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
To create liability for defamation there must be:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the
publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of
special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the
publication. 173

Defamation is available to businesses as well as individuals:
One who publishes defamatory matter concerning a
corporation is subject to liability to it
(a) if the corporation is one for profit, and the matter tends
to prejudice it in the conduct of its business or to deter
others from dealing with it, or
(b) if, although not for profit, it depends upon financial
support from the public, and the matter tends to interfere
with its activities by prejudicing it in public estimation.174
[51] Comments (d) and (e) to Section 569 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts provide that publishing an accusation of a crime that can result in
imprisonment, or a statement that damages the subject’s ability to do its

171

E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.3:1 (Supp. 2010).

172

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).

173

Id.

174

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 561 (1977).
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business, is actionable per se without need to show special damages.175
Thus, when a sender is wrongfully block listed, filtered or otherwise
identified as a spammer to potential service providers and customers, and
the block list and filter operator has done so either negligently or
maliciously, the sender may have an action in defamation.176
2. Intentional Interference with Prospective Business Relationships
[52] A major element common to all spam definitions is that the bulk
messages are commercial in nature.177 Thus, it follows that when a block
list or filter operator prevents an alleged spammer’s messages from
reaching their recipients, the operator’s intention, in part, is to deny the
spammer the commercial opportunities the messages represent.178 As
such, a non-spammer wrongfully block listed or filtered, may look to the
tort of intentional interference with prospective contractual relation for
remedy:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with
another’s prospective contractual relation . . . is subject to
liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from
loss of the benefits of the relation, whether the interference
consists of

175

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 cmt. d, e (1977); see also Candace
Rondeaux, Anti-Spam Conviction Is Upheld, N.C. Man Flooded AOL Customers with
Unsolicited E-Mail, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2006, at B3, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/05/AR2006090501166.
html (discussing the conviction of Jeremy Jaynes and his nine-year prison sentence).
176

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 561 (1977).

177

See discussion supra Part V.

178

See Sharon Gaudin, Q & A: Dave Rand on Spam, NETWORK WORLD (Sept. 10, 2001),
http://www.networkworld.com/research/2001/0910featside4.html. “MAPS is not about
stopping spam. MAPS is about stopping spammers. . . . It’s clear that the MAPS lists
can help reduce the amount of spam that subscribers get, but they also help to reduce the
number of spammers.” Id. (quote provided by David Rand, Executive Director, Mail
Abuse Prevention Systems).
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(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter
into or continue the prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the
prospective relation.179
[53] The cause of action of intentional interference with prospective
contractual relation is even more applicable in situations where block list
and filter operators publicly identify an alleged spammer or label its
messages as “spam,” or automatically place the sender’s messages in a
recipient’s junk or deleted mail folder. In such situations, it is clear that
the operator’s intention is to keep the sender from doing business with the
operator’s user base.180 This intention is further evident where an operator
labels not only bulk messages, but all of a sender’s messages, as spam,
which greatly impedes the sender’s ability to operate its business at all.181
3. Other Possible Claims
[54] A sender wrongfully labeled a spammer has avenues of recourse
beyond claims for defamation and intentional interference with
prospective contractual relation. Depending on the facts and applicable
state law, a plaintiff also may consider claims of unfair competition,
restraint of trade, and interference with contractual relations.182 The

179

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1979).

180

See Gaudin, supra note 178.

181

See Sharon Gaudin & Suzanne Gaspar, The Spam Police, NETWORK WORLD (Sept. 10
2001), http://www.networkworld.com/research/2001/0910feat.html (“Ron May, MIS
manager for SearsCarpet.com, a franchise carpet and upholstery cleaning service in
Columbus, Ohio, knows all about collateral damage. May says SearsCarpet.com’s e-mail
server was blacklisted by MAPS without warning, stranding 25 telecommuters who
couldn’t send mail for two-and-a-half weeks and bouncing back 40% of outgoing e-mail
messages. During a seven-week period, May’s small IT department spent $25,000 in
staff time trying to get off MAPS’ blacklist and reconfigure 150 user workstations. All
because a hacker used an open relay on May’s network to send out millions of spam
messages.”).
182

See Kramer v. Perez, 595 F.3d 825, 828 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that the plaintiff
brought multiple claims, including “unfair competition, conversion, trespass, unjust
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difficulty with such claims, though, is that while a sender may
demonstrate actual damages – to the extent that a blocked communication
caused the party specific harm183 – the specter of 47 U.S.C. § 230’s broad
immunity often impedes plaintiffs from receiving any or all of their sought
after redress.184
B. Spam Filter Litigation in United States Courts
[55] United States courts litigate a number of cases regarding wrongful
operation of spam filters. Some cases focus on the First Amendment right
to free speech,185 while others follow the business tort pattern previously
discussed.186 However, as the following sections reveal, regardless of the
type of claim, 47 U.S.C. § 230 largely limits the success of most spam
filter litigation.

enrichment, intentional interference with contract, and intentional interference with
prospective business advantage”); Optinrealbig.com, LLC v. Ironport Sys., Inc., 323 F.
Supp. 2d 1037, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (noting that the plaintiff sought injunction based
on claims of “trade libel, intentional interference with contractual relations and unfair
competition”); Mail Abuse Prevention Sys. LLC v. Black Ice Software, Inc., No. CV
788630, 2000 WL 34016435, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2000) (noting that the crosscomplainant filed claims of, “(1) defamation; (2) intentional interference with contractual
relationship; (3) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (4) unfair
competition; and (5) restraint of trade”).
183

See e360 Insight, LLC v. Spamhaus Project, No. 06 C 3958, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
57654, at *22-25 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2010).
184

See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006); see also Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d
1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2009).
185

See Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 447 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (holding that America Online was not dedicated to public use; therefore, First
Amendment protections did not extend to Cyber Promotions’ marketing materials); see
also White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex., 420 F.3d 366, 368-69 (5th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting White Buffalo’s argument that a state university’s use of spam filters violated
its First Amendment rights).
186

See, e.g., Black Ice, 2000 WL 34016435, at *1.
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1. The Black Ice and OptInRealBig Cases: Early Exploration
of the Limits of 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B)
[56] A number of defendants in cases concerning spam filters and
similar technologies raise 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) as a defense.187 The first
provision of 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) provides immunity for both users and
providers of an “interactive computer service” who, in “good faith,” limit
access to a broadly defined list of “objectionable” material.188 The second
provision protects those who provide a technical means of access to the
material.189 The first cases invoking this statute involved similar free
speech concerns to the Stratton Oakmont case, namely the use of message
boards and other textual postings.190
[57] Mail Abuse Prevention Systems LLC v. v. Black Ice Software, Inc.,
provides an early example of spam filter litigation.191 Mail Abuse
Prevention System (“MAPS”) operated spam filter services and identified
Black Ice as a spammer in its “Realtime Blackhole List.”192 Shortly
thereafter, MAPS commenced legal action against Black Ice under
California’s Business & Professions Code, §17538.45, the state anti-spam

187

See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2009); see
also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
188

See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).

189

See id.

190

See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328, 332 (4th Cir. 1997)
(holding America Online not liable for defamatory postings on one of its
message boards); see also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49-50
(D.D.C. 1998) (holding America Online immune from liability for making
available to its subscribers a defamatory article written by third-party
columnist). See generally Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., No.
31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
191

See Mail Abuse Prevention Sys. LLC v. Black Ice Software, Inc., No. CV 788630,
2000 WL 34016435, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2000)
192

Id.
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law.193 In response, “Black Ice filed [a] Cross-Complaint alleging: (1)
defamation; (2) intentional interference with contractual relationship; (3)
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (4) unfair
competition; and (5) restraint of trade.”194
[58] MAPS’ raised 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) as a complete defense to Black
Ice’s counterclaims.195 The court analyzed MAPS’ status as an interactive
service provider (since it did not provide e-mail services directly), and
found that MAPS had standing under § 230(c)(2)(B) as an “access
software provider [that] helps enable other computer users accessing the

193

Id. Section 17538.45 of California’s Business & Professional Code states:
(b) No registered user of an electronic mail service provider shall use or
cause to be used that electronic mail service provider’s equipment
located in this state in violation of that electronic mail service
provider’s policy prohibiting or restricting the use of its service or
equipment for the initiation of unsolicited electronic mail
advertisements.
(c) No individual, corporation, or other entity shall use or cause to be
used, by initiating an unsolicited electronic mail advertisement, an
electronic mail service provider’s equipment located in this state in
violation of that electronic mail service provider’s policy prohibiting or
restricting the use of its equipment to deliver unsolicited electronic mail
advertisements to its registered users.

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 17538.45 (West 2008).
194

Black Ice, 2000 WL 34016435, at *1. In addition to the litigation involving Black Ice
Software, MAPS also was involved in litigation with Media3, Yesmail, Experian
(formerly Exactis), and Harris Interactive. See Media3 Tech., LLC v. Mail Abuse
Prevention Sys., LLC, No. 00-CV-12524-MEL, 2001 WL 92389 (D. Mass. Jan. 2, 2001);
Suzanne Gaspar, E-mail Marketer Settles Suit Against MAPS, NETWORK WORLD (Oct.
26, 2001), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2001/1026maps.html; Press Release,
Harris Interactive, Harris Interactive Files Suit Against AOL, Microsoft, Qwest and Other
ISPs Over Restraint of Trade (July 31, 2000), available at http://www.dotcomeon.com/
harris.html; Oscar S. Cisneros, Yesmail Fights Blacklist Threat, WIRED (July 18, 2000),
http://www.wired. com/politics/law/news/2000/07/37621.
195

Black Ice, 2000 WL 34016435, at *8.
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Internet.”196 Next, the court analyzed “whether spam is ‘harassing’ or
‘otherwise objectionable’ material under § 230(c)(2)(A).”197 The court
found that spam could qualify as such material, but noted that MAPS also
blocked other messages, not merely the alleged objectionable spam.198
Thus, the court found standing for Black Ice’s counterclaims.199
[59] Black Ice’s defamation claim focused on the publication of Black
Ice’s name in MAPS’ Realtime Blackhole List.200 MAPS referred to
Black Ice as a spammer, a statement for which California defamation law
does not require pleading actual damages.201 According to the court’s
analysis of § 230(c)(2)(B), listing Black Ice as a spammer was not merely
a technical enabling of spam blocking, but an “announcement,” which was
a separate act.202 Thus, the defamation claim was allowed to stand.203 The
court also found standing for Black Ice’s intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage, unfair competition and restraint of trade,
and punitive damages claims, but it rejected Black Ice’s claim for
intentional interference with contractual relations because Black Ice failed
to allege “what services were contracted for, or how [they were]
disrupted.”204

196

Id.

197

Id. at *9.

198

See id.

199

Black Ice, 2000 WL 34016435, at *10.

200

See id. at *7.

201

Id. at *7 (“[S]tatements that are per se defamatory need not plead special damages;
defamatory per se statements includes any statement that tends to damage a business
reputation . . . . ‘Spammer’ and ‘spam’ are disparaging labels in the Internet business
community.”).
202

Id. at *10.

203

Id.

204

Black Ice, 2000 WL 34016435, at *10-12.
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[60] Black Ice contrasts sharply with OptInRealBig.com v. Ironport
Systems.205 In OptInRealBig, the plaintiff, a direct e-mail marketer, sued
Ironport because an Ironport subsidiary, Spamcop.net, reported
OptInRealBig as a spammer to OptInRealBig’s ISPs.206 Unlike MAPS,
Spamcop operated by passing along complaints from recipients of alleged
spam to the apparent sender’s ISP.207 Given that Spamcop acted as an
interactive service provider and merely passed along reports of spamming
in accordance with the definition of 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), the court found
that the statute fully protected Spamcop/Ironport from liability.208 Even
after upholding Ironport’s immunity under § 230, the court went on to
analyze and reject OptInRealBig’s claims regarding trade libel,
interference with contractual relations, and unfair business practices.209
2. Zango v. Kaspersky Lab and the Evolving Understanding of
“Interactive Service Provider” and “Good Faith”
[61] The interpretation of 47 U.S.C. § 230 continues to evolve, with
most courts relying on subsection (c)(1) to reject liability claims against
web site owners for third-party content, in contexts as broad as search
engines,210 online business listing categories, 211 and consumer reviews.212

205

See generally Optinrealbig.com, LLC v. Ironport Sys., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1037
(N.D. Cal. 2004).
206

Id. at 1039.

207

Id.

208

Id. at 1044, 1052.

209

Id. at 1048-50.

210

See, e.g., Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500-01 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (holding
Google not liabile for third party USENET postings it archived for public viewing).
211

See, e.g., Prickett v. InfoUSA, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 646, 652 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(holding infoUSA not liable to individuals it mistakenly listed as adult businesses).
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In fact, it appears that section 230(c)(1) protection only fails when the site
owner is an “interactive service provider” and the “information content
provider” for the material upon which the case is based.213 Instead,
section 230(c)(1) protects interactive service providers from “information
provided by another information content provider.”214 But, as Eric
Goldman notes, subsection (2) of § 230(c) “doesn’t get much love,” as
evidenced by the facts that it is not specifically referenced in the Code’s
legislative history, it has been used to resolve fewer than twelve cases, and
it has been “effectively ignored in academic literature.”215
[62] While 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) appears to address an ISP’s spam
filtering on behalf of its users, it is unclear from the statute’s plain
language whether it also covers spam block list operators, at least those
whose lists are available online.216 The Ninth Circuit recently addressed a
related question in Zango v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., in which a creator and
distributor of advertising-driven online games and video catalogs sued the
owner of a software product that filtered the plaintiff’s software as

212

See, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 544,
555 (E.D. Va. 2008) (rejecting the claims of an automobile dealer that sued a website for
posting consumers’ opinions).
213

See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“Through [47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)], Congress granted most Internet services immunity
from liability for publishing false or defamatory material so long as the information was
provided by another party.”); see also 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. Goto.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp.
2d 273, 295 (D.N.J. 2006) (“Immunity does not seem to fit here because the alleged fraud
is the use of the trademark name in the bidding process, and not solely the information
from third parties that appears on the search results page. It is not the purpose of the Act
to shield entities from claims of fraud and abuse arising from their own pay-for-priority
advertising business, rather than from the actions of third parties.”).
214

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).

215

Eric Goldman, 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(2) and Immunity for Online Filtering, ERIC
GOLDMAN, http://www.ericgoldman.org/Speeches/47usc230c2.pdf (last visited Jan. 17,
2011).
216

See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)(A). See generally Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568
F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009).
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“malware.”217 The district court, applying § 230(c)(2)(B), dismissed the
plaintiff’s various business tort claims, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed on
appeal.218
[63] In affirming the district court’s ruling, the court upheld the
determination that Kaspersky was an “interactive computer service,”219
declining Zango’s argument that the definition covers only services that
“enables people to access the Internet or access content found on the
Internet.”220 Following this determination, the court rejected Zango’s

217

Zango, 568 F.3d at 1170-72. The court noted:
[Kaspersky’s] software helps filter and block unwanted malicious
software, known as “malware,” that can compromise the security and
functionality of a computer. . . .
The Kaspersky software classifies Zango’s programs as
adware, a type of malware. Once installed on a user’s computer,
adware monitors a user’s Internet browsing habits and causes “pop-up
ads” to appear on a computer screen while the user browses the
Internet. Adware can also open links to websites and computer servers
that host malware and expose users’ computers to infection, and can
swamp a computer’s memory and slow down computer speed and
performance. For these reasons, pop-up ads and adware are unpopular
among computer users, and consumers often install security software
specifically to block adware.

Id. at 1171.
218

See id. at 1172, 1177-78. Throughout its opinion, the Ninth Circuit analyzed both the
legislative history and judicial interpretation of 47 U.S.C. §230, and noted that while it
applied §230(c)(2) in the present case, previous cases had primarily focused on
§230(C)(1). See generally id. The court rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on a footnote in
an earlier case, Batzel v. Smith, referencing (c)(2), because the provision had been “not
relevant” to the actual decision in Batzel. Id. at 1175 (citing Batzel v. Smith, 33 F.3d
1018, 1030 n.14 (8th Cir. 1994)).
219

Id. at 1175 (“We agree with the district court that Kaspersky is a ‘provider’ of an
‘interactive computer service’ under the plain terms of § 230(c).”).
220

Id.
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effort to read an implied “good faith” standard into 230(c)(2)(B) – an
argument Zango failed to raise in district court – and observed “that
subparagraph (B) comes with only one constraint: the protection afforded
extends only to providers who ‘enable or make available to . . . others’ the
technical means to restrict access to material that either the user or the
provider deems objectionable.”221
[64] Zango also argued that since Kaspersky made the decision as to
which software to block, Kaspersky did more than merely make the
technical means to restrict access available, because the users were not
given control over restriction.222 The court rejected this argument, stating:
By providing its anti-malware software and malware
definition update services, Kaspersky both enables and
makes available the technical means to restrict access to
malware. Users choose to purchase, install, and utilize the
Kaspersky software. Regardless of whether Zango is
correct in its allegation that Kaspersky does not provide
users of Kaspersky products a choice to override the
security software and download and use Zango, there is no
question that Kaspersky has “made available” for its users
the technical means to restrict access to items that
Kaspersky has defined as malware. Therefore, Kaspersky
satisfies the requirements of subsection (B) so long as the
blocked items are objectionable material under §
230(c)(2)(A).223
The court assumed that users could choose whether to install and utilize
the Kaspersky software, and that this ability “is consistent with the

221

Zango, 568 F.3d at 1177 (alterations in original).

222

Id. at 1176.

223

Id.
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statute’s express policy of relying on the market for the development of
interactive computer services.”224
3. e360 v. Spamhaus: Jurisdictional Issues in International Block Lists
[65] A recent, and controversial, case regarding spam block lists and
alleged false listings involves e360 Insight (“e360”), an online marketer,
and its placement on the Spamhaus ROKSO list.225 Located in Wheeling,
Illinois, e360 first brought suit against Spamhaus in June 2006 in the
Illinois Circuit Court alleging that Spamhaus had improperly listed e360
on the ROKSO list even though e360 denied having been a spammer or
otherwise qualify for the ROKSO list.226
After e360 obtained a
temporary restraining order from the Illinois state court, Spamhaus
requested, and received, removal of the case to the U.S. District Court for

224

Id. at 1177.

225

See e360 Insight, LLC v. Spamhaus Project, No. 06 C 3958, 2010 WL 2403054, at *1
(N.D. Ill. June, 11, 2010). Spamhaus’ ROKSO Frequently Asked Questions page
indicates that:
The Register of Known Spam Operations (ROKSO) is a
register of spam senders and spam services that have been thrown off
Internet Service Providers 3 times or more in connection with
spamming or providing spam services, and are therefore repeat
offenders.
Spamhaus believes that these known determined
professional spam operations are responsible for approximately 80% of
spam on the internet.
The ROKSO database collates information and evidence on
each spam operation to assist ISP Abuse Desks and Law Enforcement
Agencies.
The existence of these known professional spammers, the
aliases they use to obtain ISP accounts, their methods and history is
vital need-to-know information for the protection of internet networks.
ROKSO FAQ, supra note 3.
226

See e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d. 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2007).
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the Northern District of Illinois.227 After the case was moved to the
District Court, Spamhaus denied that the court had jurisdiction, and
shortly thereafter its attorney’s withdrew.228 On September 13, 2006, the
district court entered a default judgment against Spamhaus for
$11,715,000 in damages and $1,971.05 in litigation costs.229
[66] As part of its proposed remedies under the default judgment, e360
requested that the court order ICANN230 to suspend the Spamhaus.org
domain name, which prompted Spamhaus to obtain new counsel and give
notice that it intended to appeal to the Seventh Circuit.231 On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit upheld the default judgment, but denied the excessive
damages and injunctive relief, and remanded the case for further
proceedings regarding damages.232 In June 2010, Judge Kocoros issued
his final decision, reducing the original multimillion-dollar default
judgment to a mere $27,002.233

227

See id.

228

See id. at 595-96.

229

See id. at 597.

230

See INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES & NUMBERS, http://www.icann.org (last
visited Jan. 17, 2011) (providing information about the organization that manages the
allocation of .com, .org, .net, and other top-level domain names). Ultimately, Judge
Kocoras of the district court denied the suspension of the domain name. See Order, 360
Insight, LLC v. Spamhaus Project, No. 06 C 3958 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2006), available at
http://www.icann.org/legal/spamhaus/denial-proposed_order-19oct06.pdf.
231

See Order, 360 Insight, LLC v. Spamhaus Project, No. 06 C 3958 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19,
2006), available at http://www.icann.org/legal/spamhaus/denial-proposed_order-19oct06.
pdf.
232

See e360 Insight, 500 F.3d at 606.

233

e360 Insight, LLC v. Spamhaus Project, No. 06 C 3958, 2010 WL 2403054, at *8
(N.D. Ill. June, 11, 2010). While its case against Spamhaus was still pending, e360 filed
suit against Comcast, a major ISP, based upon Comcast’s alleged blocking of e360’s
marketing e-mail messages. See e360Insight, LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d
605, 606 (N.D. Ill. 2008). In its complaint, e360 alleged that Comcast “regularly blocked
emails e360 has attempted to send to Comcast customers who have signed up to receive
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[67] While this case raised a number of important issues, most notably
jurisdiction, Spamhaus’ decision not to appear in the federal case meant
that the 47 U.S.C. § 230 defense was never a potential factor.234 Although
e360’s claims were similar to those in the Black Ice and OptInRealBig
cases, such as defamation and tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage, the jurisdictional dispute and default nature of the
judgment makes it difficult to analyze the strength of e360’s legal
arguments and the likelihood of their success on the merits.235
[68] The jurisdictional dispute itself raises an interesting question. Is an
out-of-state or offshore entity that knowingly incorporates a company into
a spam filter responsible for any damages its action cause in the
jurisdiction in which the filtered company is located? Several United
States cases – including Bochan v. La Fontaine236 and U.S. v. Ivanov237 –

such emails.” Complaint at 5, e360Insight, LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 605
(N.D. Ill. 2008) (No. 08 C 340), available at http://www.spamsuite.com/node/353 (¶19).
Among the claims indentified in e360’s Complaint are tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage; a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; a
violation of e360’s First Amendment rights, and unfair competition and business
practices. Id. at 7-14 (¶¶ 25-62). In its responsive filing, Comcast denied the allegations
and raised the 47 U.S.C. § 230 and 15 U.S.C. § 7701 et seq. immunities, as well as
various other defenses under state anti-spam laws, as an affirmative defense. See
Comcast’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses at 20, e360Insight, LLC v. Comcast Corp.,
546 F. Supp. 2d 605 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (No. 08 C 340), available at
http://www.spamsuite.com/node/370 (¶¶ 64, 65). E360 also filed, and subsequently
withdrew, a number of state and federal suits against several anti-spam advocates who
criticized the company online. See E360 Drops Lawsuit Against Feguson [sic], Gunn,
and Chien — Again, SPAM DIARIES (June 2, 2008), http://thespamdiaries.blogspot.com/
2008/06/e360-drops-lawsuit-against-feguson-gunn.html.
234

e360 Insight, 500 F.3d at 600 (holding that the district court did not err in concluding
that Spamhaus effectively waived his previously asserted defenses). Spamhaus, by
abandoning all defenses to the claims against it, did not allow the court to consider the
possible merits of the 47 U.S.C. § 230 defense. See id.
235

See supra notes 191-209, 225-34 and accompanying text.

236

See Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692, 697 (E.D. Va. 1999) (finding that
long-arm jurisdiction in a defamation case extended over Maryland and New Mexico
defendants, in part because damage occurred in Virginia to a Virginia-based plaintiff).
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and international courts,238 have examined this question in the online
context. Given the unusual disposition of e360 Insight v. Spamhaus
Project, it is unclear whether the case opens the door for others to bring
lawsuits against Spamhaus and other international block list and spam
filter operators in United States courts, or how 47 U.S.C. § 230 would
impact such cases.
IX. SETTING THE STANDARDS: REVISING THE CURRENT
SAFE HARBOR TO PROVIDE DUE PROCESS
A. The Need for Redress
[69] Spam places both a time and a financial burden on networks and
users with its unceasing torrent, and the incentives of e-mail as a
marketing tool continue to encourage new spammers to enter the field.239
At the same time, senders wrongfully accused and labeled as spammers
face significant reputational and financial harm.240 To what standard of
conduct and diligence, then, should block list operators be held?

237

See United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 372 (D. Conn. 2001) (finding
jurisdiction over a Russian-based hacker who broke into Connecticut-based databases
because the data theft occurred in Connecticut and the plaintiff received threatening emails in Connecticut).
238

See Aussie Can Sue Over Online Story, WIRED (Dec. 10, 2002), http://www.wired.
com/news/business/0,1367,56793,00.html (permitting Australian magnate Joseph
Gutnick to sue Dow Jones in Australia over a story published in the United States).
239

See Spam, a Lot, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2011, at A26 (estimating that it costs $80 to
send a million spam messages); see also Final Report, ICT APPLICATIONS &
CYBERSECURITY DIV., ITU Study on the Financial Aspects of Network Security:
Malware and Spam 20-22 (July 2008), www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/itustudy-financial-aspects-of-malware-and -spam.pdf.
240

See Stophaus, Fact: Spamhaus Have [sic] Added Innocent IP Blocks to Their
Blacklists, BLOGSPOT (Mar. 23, 2009), http://stophaus.blogspot.com/2009/03/factspamhaus-have-added-innocent-ip.html.
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[70] One could argue that market forces are sufficient to keep block
lists under control. Under this theory, if a block list is overzealous and
generates too many false positives, users will reject it for another, more
accurate product.241 On a macro level, this theory makes sense where a
single, legitimate sender’s messages (or even Web site) are blocked,
unless a large number of users expect to receive the messages, the impact
an incorrect block listing has on the community as a whole will be
minimal, thereby making any resulting market forces negligible. On the
flip side of this example, the consequences for the sender can be severe,
and absent the ability to utilize the courts, he has little recourse, especially
when a block list operator explicitly assumes that anyone claiming an
incorrect listing is dishonest.242
[71] If courts were more willing (and able) to hold major block list and
filter operators accountable for their failure to properly police for false
positives, and exercise jurisdiction when the list owner knows or should
know that its products are being used in the court’s region, block list
operators would have to take notice. Unfortunately, the broad application
of the safe harbors of 47 U.S.C. § 230 to block list and filter operators, as
well as ISPs and message board hosts, has made redress in United States
courts difficult, if not impossible, absent an extraordinary showing of
malice or negligence that might counter the presumption of good faith.243
[72] While the 47 U.S.C. § 230 safe harbor is designed to encourage
Internet development and avoid the potential chilling effects of Stratton
Oakmont,244 it has effectively enabled block list providers to shut down
legitimate e-mailers by mistake or inaction, and then decline to remedy the
situation with little fear of legal consequences. On one hand, in light of

241

See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1177 (9th Cir. 2009).

242

See ROKSO FAQ, supra note 3.

243

See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2006) (noting that “good faith” is a defense to civil
liability).
244

Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
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the number of e-mail recipients whose inboxes feel the effect of the major
block lists, this is an unacceptable system.245 On the other hand, given the
utility and necessity of spam block lists to maintain the usability of email,246 eliminating spam block lists from the protections of 47 U.S.C. §
230, and thereby exposing any block list provider to lawsuits for
legitimate as well as illegitimate listings, would likely result in rapid
deterioration of e-mail as a viable resource.247
[73] Based upon the cases and discussion above, the current
jurisprudence with regard to 47 U.S.C. § 230 makes it almost impossible
for a mislabeled sender to obtain judicial remedy, even where the block
list operator created the improper listing with knowledge that the listed
party did not actually send any unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail. At
the same time, the lack of a legal standard for block list providers, with
regard to either due process or objectivity, means that self-help remedies
are often minimal or unavailable for the improperly listed party.248 What
is left, then, is a safe harbor whose provisions may go well beyond
preventing the lawsuits and disincentives for Internet development.
B. The DMCA as a Model for a Revised 47 U.S.C. §230
[74] The existence of another safe harbor law may provide some
significant guidance for lawmakers seeking to retain the protections of 47
U.S.C. § 230 while fixing the challenges for parties improperly placed on

245

See Spamhaus SBL, supra note 113.

246

See State of Spam, A Monthly Report, SYMANTEC (Aug. 2009),
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_
08-2009.en-us.pdf (“While overall spam volumes averaged 89 percent of all email
messages in July 2009, spam volumes continue to fluctuate. During July 2009, image
spam continued to have an impact reaching 17 percent of all spam during one point in
July. Health spam decreased by 17 percent, while product and 419 spam both saw
increases of eight and three percent respectively month over month.”).
247

See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a) (2006) (outlining congressional findings that the efficient use
of e-mail should be promoted through proper control mechanisms).
248

See id. § 230(c)(2).
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spammer block lists: the takedown notice provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).249 While the exact provisions of
the DMCA may not lend themselves precisely to the block list context, the
overall approach of designation, mandated procedures, mandated action,
the right to appeal, and protections against abuse, would significantly
improve the legal rights of innocent senders, while retaining the
protections spam block list operators, and ISPs, currently enjoy for their
good-faith actions to preserve the integrity and usability of e-mail.250
[75] While some block lists already have procedures similar to the
DMCA’s takedown notice provisions, such procedures are not
standardized.251 If a statutory takedown notice requirement is adopted, a
block list provider who fails to adhere to the takedown procedures will not
be able to claim immunity from lawsuit under 47 U.S.C. § 230 any more
than an online service provider that ignores takedown notices is
immunized from copyright actions under the DMCA.252
[76] The first element of a DMCA-like revision to the 47 U.S.C. § 230
safe harbor would to mandate that the party wishing to take advantage of
the liability limitation publish a designated point of contact for those
wishing to object to block listing.253 In this way, whether it is a
commercial vendor or a volunteer organization that operates the block list,
those who wish to notify an operator of an error have a centralized
database of contact information from which to work.254 From a functional

249

See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).

250

See generally id. § 512.

251

See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2). Not all block list providers are equally open to complaints
from listed parties or their legal representatives. See ROKSO FAQ, supra note 3.
252

See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2).

253

See id. (“The limitations on liability established in this subsection apply to a service
provider only if the service provider has designated an agent to receive notifications of
claimed infringement.”).
254

The DMCA requires service providers to list and keep current contact information for
an agent for service of process on the Copyright Office website. See 17 USC § 512(c)(2);
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perspective, given that the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has
primary federal jurisdiction over spam complaints pursuant to the CANSPAM Act,255 and maintains a Web-based resource for spam-related
issues,256 it would be logical for the FTC to host the block list provider
database. A revised statute need not mandate that providers identify
themselves with the FTC, but it should require that providers do so if they
intend to take advantage of the safe harbor.257
[77] A centralized provider list would assist consumers and businesses
that wish to object to an improper block listing, but it would be
insufficient without imposing a reasonable standard for response.258
Under the DMCA, service providers must, upon receipt of a proper
takedown notice,259 “respond[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access
to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of
infringing activity.”260 Similarly, a revision to the block list safe harbor

see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS, SERVICE PROVIDER
DESIGNATION OF AGENT TO RECEIVE NOTIFICATION OF CLAIMS OF INFRINGEMENT,
available at http://www.copyright.gov/onlinesp/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
255

15 U.S.C. § 7706(a) (2006).

256

FED. TRADE COMM’N, SPAM, RULES & ACTS, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/
microsites/spam/rules.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
257

See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2).

258

See id. § 512(c)(3).

259

Id.

260

See id. § 512(c)(1)(C). Interestingly, in Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermillion Fine Arts,
Inc., a case involving the application of the DMCA’s takedown notice, the Tenth Circuit
noted the possibility that a takedown notice could be used maliciously to shut down a
competitor. 514 F.3d 1063, 1073 (10th Cir. 2008). The court further noted that, if used
in such manner, a takedown notice could provide grounds for a tortuous interference suit.
See id. The court found that “crediting the complaint as true as we must at this stage of
the litigation, and further giving it the solicitous construction due a pro se filing, the facts
described above are sufficient to permit an inference that [D]efendants tortiously
interfered with [P]laintiffs' business.” Id. (citation omitted).
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should require that protected providers act quickly upon receipt of notice,
which should include, at a minimum, the server IP address and other
technical information to enable the provider to locate and verify the
listing.261
[78] Under the DMCA, after the service provider has removed or
disabled the alleged infringing content, the party responsible for posting
the content is entitled to notification of the removal and may file a counter
notice to appeal the content’s removal.262 However, this is not an
unlimited right to reverse all takedowns, and in the case of “repeat
infringers,” service providers must adopt and provide notice of policies to
ensure such users cannot infringe indefinitely.263 Likewise, a revised 47
U.S.C. § 230 safe harbor should grant block list operator the option to relist an IP address if the address sends further spam-like e-mail, or if the
operator continues to receive spam notices or block requests from its
customers pertaining to that IP address.
[79] Moreover, like the DMCA, a revised spam-statute should grant
block list operators the opportunity to create and implement a policy to
terminate access by repeat infringers.264 This policy would permit block
list operators to ignore certain listing objections and prevent bulk senders
from repeatedly claiming improper listing, which force operators to cycle
spammers on and off their lists.265 But such a right of refusal must not be
absolute. The revised statute must require good faith refusal based upon

261

See id.

262

17 U.S.C. § 512(g).

263

Id. § 512(i)(1)(A) (“The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply
to a service provider only if the service provider– (A) has adopted and reasonably
implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s
system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate
circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or
network who are repeat infringers . . . .”).
264

See id.

265

See id.
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objective criteria as to the reputability of the objecting party, rather than
the block list provider’s subjective determination.266 As a further barrier
against bulk senders’ groundless, repeat counter notices, the revised
statute should incorporate a misrepresentations penalty provision similar
to that of the DMCA.267
[80] The revised statute should also adopt an overall “good faith”
prerequisite to the safe harbor immunity in (c)(2)(B) – similar to that in
(g)(1) of the DMCA268 – for providers of access control tools.269 While it
is not clear precisely how courts will apply such a good faith requirement
to block list operators, one possible understanding is that operators will be
held to utilize an objective definition of spam, rather than the various
subjective definitions currently in use.270 Further, if block list operators

266

See ROKSO FAQ, supra note 3 (“Spamhaus regularly receives letters from spammer’s
[sic] lawyers attempting to claim that all of a spammers [sic] records are in error and
demanding all therefore be removed. [Spamhaus] naturally pay[s] little attention to such
requests.”).
267

17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (“Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this
section– (1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity was
removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any damages . . .
incurred . . . as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation . . .
.”).
268

See id. § 512(g)(1).

269

The good faith exception currently applies only to users and interactive service
providers per § 203(c)(2)(A). See 47 U.S.C. § 203(c)(2)(A) (2006).
270

Even vendors that claim objective definitions of spam explicitly exercise their own
judgment as to when and how entities should be listed. See, e.g., SBL Advisory, SBL
Policy & Listing Criteria, SPAMHAUS, http://www.spamhaus.org/sbl/policy.html (last
visited Jan. 17, 2011) (“The Spamhaus Block List (“SBL”) Advisory is a database of IP
addresses . . . from which Spamhaus does not recommend the acceptance of electronic
mail . . . because they appear to Spamhaus to be under the control of, or made available
for the use of, senders of Unsolicited Bulk Email (‘spammers’).”) (emphasis added);
Frequently Asked Questions, Comments and Answers, ANONYMOUS POSTMASTERS
EARLY WARNING SYS., http://www.apews.org/?page=faq (last visited Jan. 17, 2011)
(“[Network addresses from which no spam has originated] are listed because they have
been set up by known spammers and spam support operations, most with a demonstrable
repeated history of spamming or spamming services. They are also listed if they host
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want to insulate themselves from liability, they should limit blocking to
the actual IP address used to send the alleged spam, rather than expanding
their block list to include the e-mail address, or Web site, of the perceived
beneficiary of the message (i.e. the party whose products are being
advertised).271 Another method block list operators currently employ to
protect against liability, which would be limited or prohibited under this
proposed model, is to expand their listings to include other customers of
the same ISP from which the spammer sent its message, to encourage
those customers to pressure the ISP to change its policies.272
C. Balancing the Equities of the Fight Against Spam
[81] This Article’s proposal will undoubtedly raise criticism among
block lists operators, users and network administrators who believe the
current block list operator safe harbor provides effective spam fighting,
just as the overall safe harbor is seen as the most efficient way to enable
administrators to manage unwanted content while providing the freest
possible forum for legitimate discourse and communication.273 Critics

websites advertised in spam, as this too falls under spamming services - these listings
normally occur if the owners of that network address range do not remove the
offenders.”).
271

See Mail Abuse Prevention Sys. LLC, v. Black Ice Software, Inc., No. CV 788630,
2000 WL 34016435 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2000), at *9 (“Black Ice also alleges Mail
Abuse blocked Black Ice’s other servers, in addition to its mail server. This [sic]
allegations, which are presumed true for demurrer purposes, do not plead a good-faith
effort to block unsolicited bulk e-mail, but rather a bad-faith attempt to block solicited,
individual e-mails.”) (citation omitted).
272

In October 2009, Spamhaus placed all IP addresses belonging to Amazon.com’s
Amazon Web Services Elastic Compute Cloud (“EC2”) on its real-time block list after a
single EC2 customer used the service to send an e-mail containing viruses and spam. See
Brooks, supra note 5. Spamhaus ignored complaints from other Amazon EC2 customers,
and instead required that Amazon directly work with Spamhaus on the issue. See id.
Spamhaus’ refusal to work with individuals was not solely an objective or technical
issue; rather, as Spamhaus CIO Richard Cox stated, “[Spamhaus’] policy for delisting is
that the spam has to stop and our editors must be convinced it is unlikely to restart when
the listing is removed.” Id. (quote provided by Richard Cox, CIO, Spamhaus).
273

As David Ardia acknowledged:
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may argue that these suggested revisions would effectively eliminate the
safe harbor, and quickly lead block list operators to shut down their lists
for fear of lawsuits, but this argument disregards several key points.
[82] First, while block lists provide a strong, and overall positive
influence on e-mail, the impact of a mistaken or overly broad block listing
on a single sender or company can be devastating, especially when neither
the block list operator’s processes nor the current law provide adequate
financial or procedural recourse.274 Second, even with the safe harbor as it
currently exists, block list operators still receive and respond to allegations
of improper listings, whether from legitimately wronged senders or true
bulk e-mailers seeking to force their unwanted messages through.275

[W]hen intermediaries remove potentially injurious speech,
they often do so without providing an opportunity for the speaker to
contest the removal or blocking. It is costly for intermediaries to offer
dispute resolution procedures to their users. It is far less costly to
simply remove speech at the first sign of trouble or to decline to carry
controversial speech in the first place. In fact, any increase in the
baseline liability for intermediaries will impact their willingness to
facilitate potentially injurious speech.
A “profit-maximizing
intermediary likely will choose the mechanism that is least costly,
rather than the one that preserves the most speech.”
Moreover, even if intermediaries were capable of determining
what speech is tortious or unlawful, it is unlikely that they would be
able to adequately weigh or capture the full social value of the speech
they are poised to interdict. Accordingly, “if we impose the full social
costs of harm from third-party postings on intermediaries, but they
cannot capture the full social benefits of those postings, they will
respond by inefficiently restricting the uses that third parties can make
of the Internet.” We would therefore expect to see excessive
curtailment of speech, as risk-averse intermediaries filter and block all
but the most banal speech. This likely would leave us with something
akin to what cable television provides: content from a short list of
preapproved providers.
Ardia, supra note 18, at 391-92 (citations omitted).
274

See discussion supra Parts VI-VII; see also Ardia, supra note 18, at 412 n.194.
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See discussion supra Part VIII.
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[83] Requiring that block list operators follow additional procedural
safeguards and act in good faith to obtain safe harbor immunity, especially
if coupled with a formal penalty for a blocked party’s false reporting,
should not substantially increase the number of complaints, or the time or
money needed to respond. Rather, it will give true victims of improper
block listing a chance to obtain relief when their legitimate requests for
assistance go unanswered. While this revision would not itself address all
potential issues,276 it would at least set a standard for block list conduct
that could reduce the likelihood of future lawsuits.
X. CONCLUSION: CLOSING THE GAPS, REQUIRING RESPONSIBILITY
[84] Commercial and volunteer block list operators alike affect
numerous commercial relationships and the financial health of companies.
They exercise, at the very least, indirect control over access to billions of
e-mail accounts whose owners are unaware of which block lists filter their
inboxes. Because of the significant practical and commercial impacts
associated with the list operators’ procedures and choices, block list
operators should be held to a professional standard of conduct that
includes objectivity, reasonable care, and accountability. The current
alternative – relying on block list operators’ good faith and internal
procedures, while granting them broad statutory immunity – is no longer
acceptable. Just as letter carriers are held accountable when their actions
affect mail delivery,277 the law must require that block list, and spam filter,
operators make every reasonable effort to ensure their actions do not
prevent the delivery of legitimate e-mail, and impose consequences when
these requirements are not met.

276

For example, the international jurisdictional dispute that was at the heart of e360 v.
Spamhaus. See e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project, Ltd., 500 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2007).
277

See Jen McCaffery, Missing Mail Found in Roanoke Residence, ROANOKE TIMES,
Dec. 22, 2004, at A1, available at http://www.roanoke.com/news/roanoke/wb/xp-15772
(noting that, in December 2004, thousands of pieces of undelivered mail were found in
the Roanoke, VA home of a temporary postal worker, who faced up to five years in, and
a fine of up to $250,000 for each piece of stolen mail).
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